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The American Civil War spanned four years of bloody fratricide that divided the country. 
During those years, President Lincoln declared a blockade on all Southern ports hoping to cut 
supplies to the Confederacy in an attempt to shorten the conflict. As a result, blockade running 
became a lucrative career, and several captains, who held no allegiance to the Union or 
Confederacy, took advantage of the potential profits. One such captain, William Watson, 
successfully ran the blockade from 1863 to 1865 with the assistance of the eight-man crew on the 
centerboard schooner Rob Roy. On 2 March 1865, Rob Roy was intentionally run aground and 
burned in Deadman’s Bay off the coast of Florida to avoid capture. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to the overall understanding of blockade running in the Gulf of Mexico during the 
American Civil War by looking at the political, economic, and social relationships between 
people interacting with Rob Roy by completing a historical, archaeological analysis of sail versus 
steam in the Gulf of Mexico.  If found during the search, the theoretical concept of agency and 
artifact biography would have been utilized to understand the interactions between people and 
Rob Roy. Artifact biography studies recognize the undeniable relationship between people and 
objects and the vital role an object plays in understanding the cultural past of humans.  
This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary historical sources to analyze the unique 
role Rob Roy played in the American Civil War while comparing its success to other blockade 
runners of the Gulf of Mexico. The archaeological fieldwork conducted for this research 
provided additional information that contributed to the overall understanding of social 
interactions in ports along the Gulf Coast. Ultimately, the main question is, “what contribution 
does the study of one blockade runner have on the general understanding of the interaction of 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The study of Civil War blockade runners is not a new concept. Several archaeologists and 
historians have contributed to the historical record by following the life of blockade runners and 
their subsequent shipwreck sites. One of the most well-known examples of this is J. Barto 
Arnold’s work on the Civil War-Era steamer Denbigh. Denbigh was a British-owned steamer 
that successfully ran several blockades between Havana and Mobile. The information Arnold has 
been able to collect for just this blockade running vessel has added to the understanding of 
economic and social conditions for blockaders and business owners during the Civil War 
(Arnold 2011:13). Gordon Watts, another Civil War historian, and archaeologist has conducted 
extensive work researching Mobile Bay and its subsequent shipwrecks. His work encompasses 
both Union blockaders and Confederate blockade runners. The remains of the ironclad vessel 
USS Tecumseh and blockade runner Ivanhoe have added to the understanding of ship 
construction and the historical record of the American Civil War (Watts 1998).  
Blockade running, by trade, connects people of many walks of life across large 
geographical areas that may never have interacted were it not for times of war. Vessels like 
Denbigh and Modern Greece, another British-owned steamer and blockade runner researched by 
East Carolina graduate Chelsea Freeland, are crucial in viewing these connections (2014). The 
case of Rob Roy is unique in that it combined history and archaeology since most of its life as a 
blockade runner was narrated by its owner and captain, William Watson. As such, Rob Roy’s 
past should provide sociocultural information about the relationships of individuals within the 




 The history of an object like a seagoing vessel is like that of a historical account of a 
person. Essential elements pulled from the history of a ship include construction, purpose, use, 
and impacts within the region of use. Through a comprehensive study of the history of a vessel, 
one can better understand the international, national, regional, and local “platforms creating a 
holistic approach to studying and assessing historic shipwrecks” (Colwell-Pasch 2014:8). 
Through the same study, a blockade runner’s role in the Civil War can be better understood.  
The significance of this research is multi-faceted. It will add to the history of blockade 
running during the American Civil War within the Gulf of Mexico. It would have contributed to 
the first application of the concept artifact biography to a Civil War blockade runner to further 
explore the agency of Rob Roy if the vessel had been located. 
 
Research Objectives and Questions 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to add to the general understanding of blockade running in 
the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War by investigating and interpreting the life of 
Rob Roy. The Gulf of Mexico is a maritime cultural stage for the Civil War blockade runner Rob 
Roy this vessel will tell a story of the political, economic, and social relationships of the peoples 
that interacted and continue to interact with this vessel. 
Primary 
● What contribution does the study of one blockade runner have on the general 
understanding of the interaction of ports in the Gulf of Mexico during the 
American Civil War?  
Secondary 
● What is the artifact biography of Rob Roy?  
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● What can the archaeological investigation of the proposed location of Rob Roy 
reveal about its final demise? 
 
 Justification 
The use of artifact biography approaches gives life to an artifact by expressing within a human 
cultural setting the dynamic interactions an object can have in social, political, and economic 
situations. Artifacts can evoke another time and, in turn, carry encounters of their own, between 
creator, owner, and researcher (Philip 2007:3). The blockade runner, Rob Roy, was an agent of 
change in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War. As an entity that can create 
change, an artifact is no longer merely an object, therefore, Rob Roy should be investigated in the 
historical context of the American Civil War, ship construction, and shipwreck studies.  Rob Roy 
provides a gateway to understanding ports along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico that are glossed 
over in history books.  
The captain of Rob Roy kept a diary of his life on board the vessel. Still, the time frame 
only spans from the ship's entry into blockade running in 1863 to the sale of the ship in Spanish 
Havana thirteen days before it was intentionally scuttled and burned off the Gulf Coast of Florida 
in 1865. It is unclear when the ship was built and where it was first acquired; Watson only 
provides information about where the vessel was registered under its new name in the Crown 
colony of British Honduras (modern Belize)  in 1862 and the sale of the vessel in Havana, Cuba.  
 
Civil War Blockade Running 
On 19 April 1861, the eighty-sixth anniversary of the Battle of Lexington that sparked the 
American Revolution, Abraham Lincoln introduced Proclamation No. 81, which declared a 
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blockade on all ports in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Texas (Hall 2014:21). Known as the “Anaconda Plan,” Lincoln and his advisers hoped to 
squeeze the life out of the Confederates States gradually. Unfortunately, the United States Navy 
underestimated how difficult it was to blockade ports in the Gulf of Mexico (Hall 2014:54). 
When the proclamation was first announced, not much changed in Texas since the season for 
cotton trade had just ended, and few large seagoing vessels were in the harbors (Hall 2014:24). 
The Texas coastal defense was almost non-existent as there was little to no heavy artillery 
available. By June 1861, Captain of Engineers W.H. Stevens, CS Army, had outlined defense 
plans of the Texas coast, which included Galveston, the only major seaport in Texas, as the 
central focus of protection (Underwood 2003:78). By the end of the year, “other artillery units 
were concentrated in the vicinity of Matagorda Bay and Corpus Christi, Caney Creek, and 
Sabine Pass” (Underwood 2003:79). 
The blockade itself was a political maneuver, and neither Navy truly considered what it 
would take to operate the blockade efficiently. The Union's goal was to maintain the blockade, 
and the Confederate Navy would need to figure out how to break it or circumvent it (Anderson 
1962:13). Not only would it be difficult for the divided forces of the United States to maintain 
their cause, but it would also be difficult for the countries involved in ongoing trade with the US 
to maintain their business. England issued its proclamation within a month of the Union 
declaring their neutrality in the struggle between the two powers because “there were several 
million dollars [sic] worth of English owned goods in Southern ports” (Anderson 1962:13). 
English leaders wanted to place formal protection over them as soon as possible. Several 
European nations followed England with proclamations of their own, yet most favored the Union 
despite their neutrality (Anderson 1962:13). Mexico, neighbor to the United States and bordering 
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Texas, was another neutral nation, which in turn made the Rio Grande a neutral zone. According 
to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande was deemed a neutral zone one mile 
north and south for both Texas and Mexico (Wise 1988:88). “The American blockade was not to 
be imposed on any neutral nation because the Lincoln administration felt the U.S. had 
insufficient resources to engage in another conflict in addition to the Civil War” (Underwood 
2003:67). 
Blockade running was dangerous, but essential for the Confederate States to maintain 
their war economy through the import and export of goods. In the South, “blockade running was 
not regarded as either unlawful or dishonourable, but rather as a bold and daring enterprise” 
(Watson 2001:34). It was, however, in the Union considered an act of war and, therefore, subject 
to the laws of war. Running was not necessarily carried out by experienced merchant seamen and 
officers at the beginning of the conflict, but rather anybody who wanted to make a windfall 
profit. Blockade runners were paid the highest rate wages, and bonuses were given after every 
trip, ranging from 100 to 500 dollars (Watson 2001:35). Ships were often privately owned, 
though most ships were under British or foreign registry to maintain the semblance of neutrality 
when in international waters.  
“With the Confederate domestic production never reaching 50 percent of military needs, 
goods brought in by blockade runners were essential to the Southern war effort” (Tucker 
2006:110). Without the blockade runners bringing in arms, medicines, clothing, and other 
essential war materials, it is unclear whether the Confederacy could have survived as long as it 
did. Most historians argue that the eventual collapse of supplies to the Confederate military was 
not due to the failure of blockade runners, but instead the collapse of the Southern railroad 
system (Tucker 2006:110). The change in trade due to the blockade disrupted normal patterns 
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and increased the burden on the Southern railroad network. Overall, historians agree that the 
Union blockade of southern ports was an effective use of Northern resources. If the Union 
ground forces were as committed to the blockade, the warships of the blockade would have had 
an even more substantial contribution to the defeat of the Confederate States (Underwood 
2003:112). 
The main item exported from Southern ports was cotton. After the blockade took effect, 
overland routes sprang up between Texas towns and Mexican cities, such as the one between 
Matamoros and Brownsville (Hoekstra 1951:20). “The South counted on what the period 
newspapers called King Cotton Diplomacy,” where cotton bonds became essential for 
Confederate efforts abroad (Whisker 2002:16). The port of Tampico was a point of entry for 
arms and munitions that were hauled by wagons into Texas (Thomason 1968:16). Shipments of 
goods such as cotton went through Eagle Pass to Monterrey and then to Matamoros or Veracruz 
(Hoekstra 1951:20). Trade routes between London and Matamoros, as well as New York and 
Matamoros, were established. Cotton, goods, and ammunition made their way back and forth 
between Europe and Mexico, and even between the North and South. The South was not able to 
supply their soldiers with sufficient enough arms and munitions, therefore, supplies were 
purchased overseas, including Enfield rifles made at the London Armory Company and Austrian 
Lorenz rifles (Whiskers 2002:24-5). Due to the nature of the blockade, common and luxurious 
goods became more expensive (Thomason 1968:3). 
 Profits of vast proportions could be made by blockade runners, who purchased cotton 
along the Rio Grande for six to ten cents a pound and then sold it in Europe for fifty to sixty 
cents a pound (Whisker 2002:17). The Enfield rifles, manufactured and purchased in Britain, 
originally cost around twenty-one dollars. Still, the Confederacy was forced by the blockaders to 
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purchase them for fifty dollars, and buyers in Matamoros were charged up to sixty dollars (Irby 
1977:17). Prices of goods were extremely high in Texas and the South; flour cost as much as 
twenty-two dollars per pound, tea was four to five dollars per pound, coffee was one dollar per 
pound, sugar was twenty-five cents per pound, black pepper was one dollar per pound, rice was 
forty cents per pound and five pounds of potatoes was one dollar (Thomason 1968:20). These 
goods were affected directly by the costs of war. For example, a dollar in January 1860 would 
have gone as far as 100 dollars in January 1865 (Shughart 2005:243). 
Rob Roy 
After setting the blockade on all rebelling states made by President Lincoln in 1861, it became 
difficult for northern mills to receive southern produced cotton (Hall 2014:21). The Gulf of 
Mexico held a leading role in the transfer of goods from north to south during the Civil War. The 
blockade created a lucrative business for those not loyal to the causes of the American Civil War. 
Both the Confederates and Union supporters needed supplies that they no longer could easily 
access. Blockade runners, such as Rob Roy, became significant contributors to the continued 
business between the north and south. 
Rob Roy was a centerboard schooner most likely built on the Eastern seaboard of the 
United States following specifications that would allow it to be both seaworthy and stable 
(Watson 2001:4). Rob Roy was 78 feet in length, had a beam of 22 feet 6 inches, depth of hold 6 
feet, a draft of 13 feet when the centerboard was down, and 4 feet 9 inches when the centerboard 
was up (Watson 2001:4). Its centerboard construction allowed for it to navigate the rough and 
sometimes shallow water of the Gulf Coast region of Texas and Mexico. The shallow depths and 
large sandbars created a treacherous environment for all ships, including blockade runners. Still, 
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if they were able to navigate these surroundings, the shoals would also protect the blockading US 
Navy (Watson 2001:4), whose ships generally drew more than 6 feet of water. 
 Many historians (Hall 2014:38; Underwood 2003:57; Cotham 1998:170; Cochran 
1958:202) argue that Rob Roy was one of the most successful blockade runners. The ship was 
able to maneuver the waters of the Gulf and carry cotton, weapons, and other hard to acquire 
provisions (Hall 2014:36). Some of the most frequented ports included Havana, New Orleans, 
Galveston, and Matamoros (Watson 2001:vi). Blockade runners also frequented several small 
inlets that lay along the coast of Texas. The Rio Grande was one river that played an essential 
role during the Civil War as it was a neutral zone bordering Mexico and the Confederacy (Wise 
1988:88). Blockade runners and European businesses found the trade along this zone extremely 
lucrative.  
 Rob Roy evaded Union capture from its first to its last voyage under the command of 
Captain William Watson. It successfully transported cotton and other goods to and from 
Galveston on three separate occasions. It also survived several storms, was even sunk, and later 
raised before it turned over to a new owner. Rob Roy was intentionally burned to avoid capture 
less than a month after being sold (Watson 2001:286).  
The life and death of Rob Roy is not the end; like any other agent, this Civil War 
blockade runner has its back story and journey. This detailed historical, archaeological study of 
Rob Roy demonstrates that this vessel has more to add to the historical understanding of the Gulf 
of Mexico and blockaders during the Civil War. According to Union reports (Stewart 1903:825), 
Rob Roy wrecked in Dead Man’s Bay near Steinhatchee River (Figure 1.1) along the Gulf coast 
of Florida. 




Figure 1.1. Deserter Coastline, St. Marks to Depot Key (Buker 1993:84). 
Florida borders a large portion of the Gulf of Mexico, along with several other southern states. 
This research focuses on a section of the Gulf Coast in Florida, specifically Deadman’s Bay, 
which is located at the mouth of the Steinhatchee River and is approximately 55 kilometers in 
length (Trimble et al. 1999:187). In 1528 Steinhatchee was referred to as Istenhatchee, 
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translation river of man, by its inhabitants (Briggs 2010:6). Prehistoric archaeological remains 
from this period are in the form of processed bones and stone tools. Other archaeological sites of 
the region range from the Archaic period to the early-modern period (Ellis et al. 2001:26). 
Cultures that fall within this range include Deptford, Weeden Island, and Alachua cultural 
traditions, which depended heavily on maritime resources of the area (Ellis et al. 2001:32-33,35).  
 Steinhatchee River first appeared on Spanish maps during the early 1500s and was 
crossed by the Spanish conquistador Panfilo de Narvaez in 1529 (Florida Department of State 
2017).  It was passed again by Hernando de Soto in 1539 (Florida Department of State 2017). 
According to some accounts, the area was frequented by pirates from the sixteenth century into 
the eighteenth century because it's remotely located along the Gulf of Mexico (Florida 
Department of State 2017).  
 During the early 1800s, the river played a role in the First Seminole Wars when Andrew 
Jackson crossed it in 1818 on his way to disperse Seminoles who were raiding settlements on the 
border of Georgia and Spanish Florida (Briggs 2010:6). In 1838 General Zachary Taylor crossed 
the river to intervene in the continuing skirmishes of the Second Seminole War and, within that 
same year, established Fort Frank Brooke which was only in operation for a short time and by 
1840 was abandoned (Briggs 2010:6).  
 With the outbreak of the Civil War, Steinhatchee River and Deadman’s Bay were 
destinations of blockade runners, though the area was not frequented by many broad or deep 
draught vessels because of its shallow depths. The proclamation of President Lincoln focused 
blockading efforts on larger ports like Galveston and New Orleans, left smaller ports like 
Deadman’s Bay available for blockade runners to access more freely (Wise 1988:34). It is 
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known that at least two blockade runners wrecked in Deadman’s Bay while avoiding capture by 
the Union Navy.  
The first occurred on 5 June 1862 when Havana, a Confederate screw steamer, was set 
afire to prevent capture by USS Isilda. The vessel had already been unloaded except for its 
remaining cargo of ten tons of lead and cotton (Gaines 2008:41). After its abandonment, Union 
sailors were able to salvage two chain cables, the jib, anchor, and three lead pigs (Gaines 
2008:41). The second vessel lost in Deadman's Bay was the centerboard schooner, Rob Roy. Rob 
Roy was purchased from its original captain and owner, William Watson, in Belize, Honduras. 
After less than a month under new ownership, the vessel was purposefully run aground and 
burned while being chased by USS Fox (Watson 2001:246). The new crew was attempting to 
find the mouth of the Suwannee River but instead ended up in Deadman’s Bay with a cargo of 
mechanical farming equipment and cavalry sabers. Crew members were captured, and some of 
the cargo was saved before the vessel was set on fire to avoid capture (Gaines 2008:44).   
 
Methodology 
Primary source research was conducted threefold. The original research leading to the inquiry of 
this thesis started with access to the personal journal of a blockade runner, Captain William 
Watson (2001). This journal was first accessed in 2012 at the University of Texas Pan-American 
using the library’s Special Collections while completing research for another project (Rio Grande 
Valley Civil War Trail Project, conducted by the University of Texas Pan-American, 2012). This 
information contributed directly to all other historical and archaeological research completed on 
this project.  
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 While analyzing the journal of William Watson, it was deduced that further archival 
research would need to be conducted at the National Archives Research Center in New Orleans 
as well as in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The internet was used as an additional 
source for primary materials, specifically the NOAA database of historical maps.  
 The visit to the Notarial Archives Research Center in New Orleans was completed in 
January 2018. While visiting the archives, ship logs and purchasing logs from between June to 
August 1863 were reviewed in order to identify the origins of the vessel. In each of these logs 
dimensions and ship names were recorded. 
 Additionally, it was necessary to research and analyze geographical information of the 
rumored wreck site of Rob Roy. The most prominent source of information for this phase of 
primary source research was the NOAA Historical Maps and Charts Collection. There, several 
maps and charts created over several years were analyzed and overlaid in GIS to corroborate 
historical records and oral histories of the area.  
Secondary Sources 
Broader topics needed to be addressed while conducting historical research as well. The most 
prevalent were the American Civil War, as well as the involvement of the two states discussed in 
this thesis: Texas and Florida. Blockade running was another topic researched both generally and 
specifically to the Civil War. Under the research umbrella of the Civil War, other related issues 
included blockade running, the people involved in blockade, and the tools used to complete these 
tasks. This led to a search of vessels used for blockade running in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as 
the geographical features of the area that would have affected the ability to successfully run a 
blockade. Other research included oceanographic; bathymetric data of the Gulf of Mexico and 
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how it might affect vessel construction. Weather patterns in the Gulf of Mexico were also 
researched to better understand the effects of storms on shipwrecks.  
 Next, historical research of Rob Roy and other centerboard schooners was conducted. As 
the project progressed, it became necessary to delve further into the construction of shallow draft 
vessels. Similar vessels used in the region were also researched. This was completed to narrow 
down the possible origins of Rob Roy. All historical research was completed using East Carolina 
University’s Joyner Library.  
 Steam boilers were researched as a result of the Fall 2018 fieldwork. First, a general 
understanding of the types and uses of steam boilers during the Civil War was reviewed. Then, 
boiler use in Florida and salt works along the coast were investigated.  
 Additional research was completed at the Museum of Florida History in Tallahassee. This 
provided more information about previous wrecks found along the west coast of Florida, as well 
as maps of Civil War vessels. A critical secondary source used in this project was the field report 
completed by students and staff from East Carolina University in the Spring of 2017 (McKinnon 
2017). Their report provided additional historical information about the possible wreck site of 
Rob Roy.  
Archaeology Methods 
For this thesis, several archaeological methods were used for collecting relevant data. The first 
phase of surveys was conducted before this thesis using side scan sonar and oral histories as the 
primary sources of information. The second phase of the archaeological survey carried out for 
this thesis analyzed the side scan sonar data by diving on previously located targets. On those 
targets, a photographic survey was conducted along with the creation of mud maps. Once the 
data was collected, further research was conducted to understand better the information found 
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during phase two. ArcGIS was employed to georeferenced maps of the archaeological site to 
give more understanding of where the remains of Rob Roy might have been located. 
 
Thesis Outline 
This chapter introduces the topic of this thesis. Artifact biography and its role in providing a 
background of an artifact’s life and agency are discussed. Research questions with justifications 
are also offered. Finally, a brief introduction to the ship, blockade running, and previous research 
is presented as well as the methods used for research, including historical and archaeological. 
 Chapter two provides a historical background of the role blockade running has held 
through time. It also discusses the history of blockade running during the American Civil War, 
particularly within the Gulf of Mexico, and it provides a brief history of the vessel, Rob Roy. 
 Chapter three outlines the methodology used to gather information for this thesis.  
Fieldwork methods and spatial analysis methodologies are discussed in detail. Finally, the 
archaeological investigation and results are discussed. Observations are presented, including 
sketches, photos, and charts. 
 Chapter four presents and analyzes the data collected during this thesis. A historical, 
archaeological analysis of the vessel during its life as a blockade runner is presented along with 
charts created to understand the historical analysis and its results better. 
 Chapter five completes this thesis, culminating in final thoughts and conclusions. Primary 
and secondary questions are answered as a result of the observations made in the previous 
section. Finally, the limitations and future research on this topic are proposed.  
Following the conclusion is the appendix, which reviews literature pertinent to the study 
of agency and artifact biography in archaeology. It then discusses how the two concepts can be 
15 
 
used when researching the life of a vessel such as Rob Roy in maritime archaeology. This 
information would have been used in the instance of finding any archaeological remains of Rob 
Roy. 
 
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF CIVIL WAR BLOCKADE RUNNING IN THE GULF 
OF MEXICO 
At the onset of the American Civil War, President Lincoln was faced with several complicated 
decisions and hoped to bring the Union back together efficiently and as quickly as possible. 
Protecting and defending the coast would become extremely difficult as the nation was about to 
defend their country from an enemy within. To secure the coastal boundaries, Lincoln and his 
cabinet enacted the Anaconda Plan, which would squeeze the South from their economic success 
through the coastal waterways. To understand this military tactic, one must understand the 
purpose of a successful blockade and what it entails. Most simply described, a naval blockade is 
an attempt by one power to cut off all overseas communication and trade to enemy ports and 
coasts. Though a blockade is meant to cut the enemy off from an economic source, there are still 
costs for blockading that must be accounted for when planning. These costs include the 
employment of sailors, procurement of patrol vessels, and the potential costs of damage during 
coastal defense (Davis and Engerman 2006:4).  
To enact a successful blockade with the optimum results, a planner must consider certain 
things; after all, a blockade will not only affect the two main parties involved but will also affect 
neutral countries. A blockade must have the appropriate manpower and vessels available to be 
successfully carried out, not to mention enough funds to repair any damage as well as to 
maintain the crews' wages and living expenses. Other things to consider, to defend the 
boundaries successfully, including any interactions with neutral powers, this entails the 
recognition of international law. 
Blockades have been used as an official military tactic between great powers from as 
early as 1584 when the Dutch were conducting operations against Spanish held ports. This, of 
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course, was not the first time a blockade had been used during the conflict, but before this, there 
were few international standards set for nations to follow on the ocean. The Dutch, who were 
leaders of maritime trade, established treaties on traded goods and, in 1630, laid the Dutch 
Proclamation, which created basic principles on neutral vessels involved in blockades (Davis and 
Engerman 2006:6). As time progressed and the ocean became a frequent place for trade, 
interaction, and military conflict, nations began to set standard laws and regulations for those not 
involved in the conflict to remain unaffected from a blockading force.  
Due to an increase in trade between countries and across oceans, it became clear to 
leading powers that some laws could not extend or be defended at specific points on the ocean, 
therefore, laws would need to be created for international waters. During the Crimean War in the 
1850s the legality of blockades became an issue and the very first international laws on the 
subject were declared at the 1856 Congress of Paris. There were four major rules put in place “to 
define the interests of both belligerents and neutrals: 
1) “Privateering is and remains abolished.” 
2) “The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband 
of war. (‘Free ships’ make ‘free goods’.)” 
3) “Neutral flags, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to 
capture under an enemy’s flag.” 
4) “Blockades, in order to be building, must be effective; that is to say, 
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of an 
enemy.” (Davis and Engerman 2016:8). 
Overall a blockade needed to be established by a formal declaration that would define its 
geographical limits and grace period. It required to notify all nations affected by this blockade. It 
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also needed to be regularly enforced, and all limitations must be known, so no neutral nation 
could be kept from carrying out trade (Speller 2014:117).  
With a better understanding of blockades, it is essential to note that the blockade of the 
American Civil War was unique; it no longer followed the standards set aside by all previous 
blockades. Instead, the blockade initiated by Abraham Lincoln issued under Proclamation No. 81 
became a new form of both military and economic endeavor.  
As often as blockades have been used as a military tactic, so has the practice of blockade 
running. The running of blockades is a natural response for individuals to take when the 
importation and exportation of goods are being affected. Blockade running is carried out by 
those either directly affected by the blockading force or by those interested in the economic 
benefits of increased costs associated with the altered exchange of goods. The blockade of the 
American Civil War not only affected the standard enforcement of all previous blockades but 
also altered the standards of blockade running. Those vessels running the Union blockade in the 
Gulf of Mexico were uniquely designed to maneuver the rough waters and shallow coasts. To 
better understand the difficult task a blockade runner faced, it is important to first comprehend 
the unique history of the blockade in the during the American Civil War. 
 
Civil War Blockade 
A series of declarations first issued by Lincoln and then in response by Davis led to the final 
proclamation for a Union blockade on all Southern ports in April of 1861 (Anderson 1962:12). 
And so, on 19 April 1861, Lincoln passed Proclamation No. 81 that declared a blockade on all 
ports of the rebelling states. This included the Confederate states of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas (Hall 2014:21). The rules of the blockade 
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stated that the Union could search vessels attempting to cross the blockaders. Any vessel that 
was carrying contraband would be seized and eventually sold in a prize court where crew 
members of the blockading force involved would receive half of the proceeds (McNeil 2003:17). 
The purpose of the blockade, referred to as the Anaconda Plan, was to prevent the Southern 
states from exporting cotton or other products in exchange for the importation of war products 
(McNeil 2003:15). It was the hopes of Lincoln and his advisors to squeeze the economic life out 
of the Confederacy gradually. Unfortunately, the United States Navy underestimated how 
difficult it was to blockade the ports in the Gulf of Mexico (Hall 2014:54). 
The blockade itself was a political maneuver, and though it shared similarities with the 
blockades of the Union predecessors, the Northern blockade was offensive as opposed to 
defensive (Davis and Engerman 2006:109). At its inception, the blockade was nothing more than 
a “paper blockade” “-a blockade by proclamation alone or with an inadequate number of ships to 
enforce it” (Tucker 2006:79) and as the blockade was put into action neither Navy truly 
considered what it would take to control or bypass the blockade efficiently. The Union's goal 
was to maintain the blockade, and the Confederate Navy would need to figure out how to 
circumvent or breakthrough (Anderson 1962:13). To manage Union naval strategy, a committee, 
referred to as the Blockade Board, was set by the Commission of Conference on 27 June 1861. 
They decided that for the blockade to become effective, the Union navy would have to carry out 
considerable operations along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts (Tucker 2006:81). 
Not only would it be difficult for the divided forces of the United States to maintain their 
cause, but it would be difficult for the countries involved in ongoing trade with the States to 
maintain their business. England issued its own decree within a month of the Union. They 
declared their neutrality in the struggle between the two powers because millions of dollars’ 
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worth of English owned goods were stored in Southern ports, and English leaders wanted to 
place formal protection over them as soon as possible (Anderson 1962:13). “Other European 
nations followed with similar proclamations and, in the long run, European neutrality tended to 
favor the Union” (Anderson 1962:13). Mexico, neighbor to the United States and bordering 
Texas, was another neutral nation, which in turn made the Rio Grande a neutral zone. According 
to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande was deemed a neutral zone one mile 
north and south for both Texas and Mexico (Wise 1988:88). “The American blockade was not to 
be imposed on any neutral nation because the Lincoln administration felt the U.S. had 
insufficient resources to engage in another conflict in addition to the Civil War” (Underwood 
2003:67).  
To order a blockade is completely different than putting a squadron together, and because 
the nation's resources were divided between the North and South, it meant that the Union and 
Confederacy would need to make drastic changes. For the United States Navy, this meant a 
quick expansion of the Navy, which caused issues with the new fleet. When the proclamation 
was made, the Union had 90 vessels, of which only forty-two were in commission (Browning 
2002:7). This meager navy would be unable to defend over thirty-five hundred miles of coastline 
and 189 river mouths and harbors, ranging from Virginia to the Rio Grande (Buker 1993:1). The 
only ships immediately available to enforce the blockade were seven steamers, five sailing ships, 
and a tender. Most of these vessels were recalled from stations around the world. Although 
several of the Union naval vessels were intimidating, they would not be effective as blockaders 
because of their deep draft (Browning 2002:7). With the few ships made available to them, the 
Union set the first blockade of New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi River on 26 May 
1861, and in June of that same year, Union ships were organized into the Gulf Coast Blockading 
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Squadron (Tucker 2006:185) (Figure 2.1). By 1862 four squadrons had been created and were 
assigned coastline to maintain. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was stationed off the 
coasts of Virginia and North Carolina. At the same time, the South Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron was assigned the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida up to the south Cape. 
The Gulf Blockading Squadrons were separated into East and West, covering the coasts from 
Florida to the Rio Grande (Buker 1993:2) (Figure 2.2). Even though the navy was aware of the 
large expanse it was expected to defend; leaders initially felt they would easily find a way to 
manage them. What they did not consider was the unique geography of the southern shoreline 
and the additional complications this placed on outfitting the navy with sufficient force 
(Browning 2002:8). 
 




FIGURE 2.2. The Federal Blockade (https://historicsites.nc.gov/all-sites/fort-
fisher/history/port/running-blockade). 
To properly defend the blockade during expansion, the Navy was forced to charter or 
purchase any vessel they could, including ferry boats and merchant ships. The most sought-after 
vessels were New York ferry boats because they had strengthened decks and were able to “steam 
in either direction” (Underwood 2003:26). Any blockade runners that were captured would be 
added to the blockading fleet because they were well suited for chasing Confederate ships 
(Underwood 2003:27). The U.S. Navy began contracting private shipbuilders at the same time. 
The fleet expanded quickly. By August of 1861, the Federal Navy had doubled to 180 vessels 
and by the following year to 264 vessels. “By the end of the war, the Navy Department had 
purchased 313 steamers and 105 sailing craft and had commissioned a total of 670 warships, 
about 500 of which were on blockade duty” (Underwood 2003:27). From 1861 to 1865, the 
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number of officers in the Union navy increased from 1,300 to 6,700, while the number of sailors 
grew from 7,500 to 51,500 (Tucker 2006:1).  
Even though the Union was able to expand its navy quickly, they still faced logistical 
issues. As stated earlier, when planning, the unique geography of the southern shores was not 
taken into consideration. Nor was the realization that refueling and repairs on vessels would have 
to be done in ports either neutral to the Union, captured by the Union, or still under Union 
control. Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate coastline was also far too long for the South 
to properly defend as they were forced to limit defensive forces to critical locations along the 
coast. Once the North was able to secure the coast and the Confederate enclaves, they would 
have an advantage. “Not only would these provide bases and coaling stations at shorter ranges 
for the blockading warships, but the enclaves could be jumping-off points for future advances 
inland” (Tucker 2006:81). 
 The Confederacy, on the other hand, had to create their navy from scratch essentially. 
This meant that they would face issues with funding as well as collecting enough supplies and 
personnel (Luraghi 1996:32). The goal of the Confederate navy was twofold; they needed to be 
able to breach the Union blockade, and also run necessary supplies inland (Tucker 2006:10). To 
thwart the Union forces, the Confederate navy would need to acquire ironclads, but that would 
take time and supplies. Therefore, until the South could create their fleet, they were forced to 
repurpose “old sailing vessels and small schooners” for blockade running and acquire warships 
from America or Europe (Strickland 1957:85). Not only would the South need to create their 
navy from the ground up, but they were also allotted only four percent of the Confederate 
military budget. This meant that the navy would be small, and at its strength, it only employed 
750 officers and 4,450 enlisted sailors (Tucker 2006:8-9).   
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Several of the seceding states seized vessels from the Union before the war, including 
lighthouse tenders, revenue cutters, and coast survey ships. Individual state navies began to build 
suitable warships, and by July of 1861, parts or all their fleets were turned over to the central 
government of the C.S.A. (Underwood 2003:29). The division of state navies created tension and 
petty jealousy during the creation of a Confederate fleet. Still, a nucleus for the navy was formed 
and used to incorporate state vessels. By March of 1861, the construction or purchase “of ten 
gunboats, propelled by steam, and displacing from 750 to 1,000 tons” were authorized 
(Underwood 2003:29). In the latter part of 1862, the C.S.A. Navy Department had bought or 
constructed 68 vessels and had 32 more under construction. “Some of these were formidable 
vessels and were covered with railroad iron, but most were small craft ideal for work in harbors 
or rivers” (Underwood 2003:29). The Confederate government also resorted to privateering, 
employing about 20 privateers in total (Underwood 2003:29). Blockade runners, like William 
Watson, evaded the Union blockades and maintained cotton trade and correspondence between 
Confederate and European businessmen. 
 
Gulf Coast Blockade 
As the Union navy expanded and became better at setting the blockade, the Confederate navy 
was forced to find exciting ways to break through to import and export goods for the war effort. 
The Union forces were eventually split into four squadrons, two for the Atlantic coast and two 
for the Gulf coast. The West Gulf Squadron and the East Gulf Squadron defended the coastline 
from the Rio Grande to Cape Florida. The coastline of Texas and Florida would prove to be the 
most difficult to defend as they are both expansive and relatively shallow close to land, making 
the Gulf of Mexico, especially along the coasts of Texas and Mexico, tricky waters to maneuver. 
The coast of Texas is over 300 miles long and includes several freshwater inlets. Parts of the 
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coast are guarded by offshore barrier islands and can be at a distance ranging from a couple of 
hundred yards to five miles from the mainland. The waterways and bays vary in depth and can be 
extremely shallow in some locations. Galveston Bay would be twelve feet at depth, and other 
smaller inlets would range from ten feet to eight feet at low tide (Underwood 2003:5-7). The 
coast of Florida has about fourteen hundred miles of coastline, but the western coast of Florida is 
a desolate shore with few exceptions (Buker 1993:6).  
 To better defend the expanse of the Gulf Coast, the Blockade Strategy Board divided it 
into six zones according to the importance of military defense. The most important area ranged 
from the Mississippi Delta to New Orleans. The following two were Mobile Bay and the Florida 
Keys. The fourth and fifth were the west coast of Florida from Cape Sable to Cedar Key and 
from there to Perdido River. The area considered to be the least important for the Union navy to 
defend was the west coast of Louisiana and the entire coastline of Texas (Buker 1993:6). Though 
the Gulf Coast covers a large area, it still did not receive as much traffic as the Atlantic Coast did 
during the war. Not only was it more difficult to defend for the Union, but it was also more 
difficult to maneuver for blockade runners. Beyond that, government policy favored the eastern 
ports (Wise 1988:167). 
 As stated above, the port of New Orleans was one of the most important to defend along 
the Gulf Coast. “New Orleans was the largest cotton port in the world, serving as the focal point 
for the tremendous commerce that funneled down the Mississippi valley” (Wise 1988:74). New 
Orleans was a hub for coastal trade as well as trade inland by way of its well-established railway 
system. The city was situated in a central location for trade within the Confederate States and 
housed foreign investors, two major steamship firms, and local businessmen that invested in 
blockade running. On 25 April 1862, just over a year after the blockade declaration, New 
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Orleans was captured by the Union Naval Forces. The Union victory at New Orleans caused the 
Confederacy a great loss as not only its largest city but its largest port. Before New Orleans fell, 
fewer than thirty vessels ran the blockade (Wise 1988:80). 
 Mobile Bay was considered the next most important port for the Union to capture, and 
because it was the closest inlet to the Mississippi River after the fall of New Orleans, that 
importance increased. The relationship that Mobile and New Orleans held before the war meant 
that Mobiles traffic would increase after 1862. The major difference between these two ports is 
the maneuverability of blockade runners. “If the blockade runners survived the trip to Mobile, 
they had their choice of three entrances into the harbor” (Wise 1988:169). The blockade runners 
were dependent on the Confederate fortifications that surrounded the entrance of the bay, and if 
they held, it would be difficult for the Union to overcome. Through the course of the war, Mobile 
saw steady traffic of blockade runners, eventually becoming an important center for Confederate 
imports. Mobile fell to Union forces on 5 August 1865, though the loss of this port was nowhere 
as costly to the South as ports along the East Coast. From the beginning of the war until the 
capture of Mobile, the bay saw about almost a hundred blockaders break the Union blockade 
(Wise 1988:180).  
 Situated less than 600 miles from the ports of Mobile and New Orleans is the Spanish 
island of Cuba. Though it was not in the jurisdiction of the Union blockade, it was an important 
contributor to the flow of trade within the Gulf of Mexico. Havana was utilized by blockade 
runners for refueling as well as changing titles to more easily circumvent the blockade. The large 
deep-water harbor lay 540 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River, 590 miles from 
Mobile, and 850 miles from the Texas port of Galveston. Though much of trade into Havana was 
carried out by southern states, the North utilized the convenient location of this island for 
27 
 
themselves by exchanging goods for their well-being alongside southern investors (Wise 
1988:76).  
 Neighboring Cuba lay the western coastline of Florida, an area sparsely populated and 
weakly defended by the East Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron. This area was difficult to 
navigate and therefore received less traffic during the war (Buker 1993:6). Pensacola to the 
Cedar Keys along the same coastline saw most traffic likely due to the location of the railroad 
system. During the Civil War, blockade running, and salt production were common endeavors in 
West Florida and off duty blockaders would set up small scale salt works with just a handful of 
men (Wynne and Crankshaw 2011:16). One of the final tasks of the East Gulf Coast Blockading 
Squadron was to locate these small-scale operations and terminate them (Wynne and Crankshaw 
2011:16). Near the Cedar Keys lays the Suwannee River, and about fifty miles north of that, the 
Steinhatchee River located at the mouth of this river and about fifty-five kilometers in width is 
Deadman’s Bay (Trimble et al. 1999:187).  
 The area considered the least necessary to defend by the Blockade Strategy Board was 
the entire coast of Texas, an area that turned out to receive more traffic than the Union thought it 
would. The main port along the Texas coast at the start of the war was Galveston located on a 
barrier island, Galveston Island, connected to the mainland by a peninsula (Underwood 2003:5). 
Northeast of Galveston is Sabine Pass, a port that would be utilized by blockade runners, but 
never to the extent of Galveston. The other ports along the Texas coast south of Galveston were 
Matagorda Bay, Corpus Christi, and Brazos Island, a small sandbar island at the southernmost 
end of Brazos Santiago.  
“The Rio Grande empties into the Gulf of Mexico at the southern tip of Brazos 
Island; this location is named Boca Chica. Because of numerous sandbars at the 
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entrance of the river, all but shallow draft vessels were prevented from entering 
either Texas or Mexico by way of the Rio Grande. Most traffic went through 
Brazos Santiago and Point Isabel. The Rio Grande itself was something of a wild, 
uncontrolled river, flooding often and sometimes shifting course. Upstream thirty 
miles or so are the twin cities of Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoros, Mexico” 
(Underwood 1993:9).  
The Union spent little time blockading the Texas coast, and when they tried to overtake 
Galveston in 1862, they failed. After Galveston was compromised, blockade running increased 
further down the Texas coast and into the Rio Grande.  
As the war progressed, both the Union and Confederate Navy’s adjusted their fleets 
according to circumstances as they arose. To maintain a successful campaign in the Gulf of 
Mexico entailed further adjustment on both sides. The South incorporated the use of more 
steamships as well as any shallow draft vessels made available to them. Once the Union caught 
these blockaders, they would be utilized as blockade runners that could better maneuver the 
unique geography of the Gulf of Mexico. As the navies slowly grew, so did independent 
blockade running by sympathizers of the Confederacy or those simply looking to make a profit 
on the increased trade within the region. Most blockade runners ran the blockade off the east 
coast, but many functioned in the Gulf of Mexico and experienced their unique adventures.  
 
Blockade Running 
Blockade running was dangerous, but it was essential for the Confederate States to maintain their 
war economy through the import and export of goods. “Blockade running was not regarded as 
either unlawful or dishonourable, but rather as a bold and daring enterprise” (Watson 2001:34). It 
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was, however, considered an act of war and, therefore, subject to the laws of war. It did not need 
to be carried out by an experienced merchant; seamen and officers who ran a blockade were paid 
the highest rate, and wages and bonuses were given after every trip, ranging from 100 to 500 
dollars (Watson 2001:35). Ships were often privately owned, though most ships were under 
British or foreign registry to maintain the semblance of neutrality when in international waters. 
As blockade running increased, so did the occurrence of companies dedicated to the lucrative 
opportunities of the new venture. These companies would often invest in part of a vessel as well 
as the value of the cargo on board. Companies were started along the East coast, at various ports 
along the Gulf coast, and even in England and Mexico. Blockade runners were not the only 
individuals to grow wealthy when a vessel would be captured the Union forces involved would 
receive compensation based on the value of the ship and its load which added more incentive to 
the capture of a blockade runner (Horner 1968:8).  
“With the Confederate domestic production never reaching 50 percent of military needs, 
goods brought in by blockade runners were essential to the Southern war effort” (Tucker 
2006:110). Without the blockade runners bringing in arms, medicines, clothing, and other 
essential war materials, it is unclear whether the Confederacy could have survived as long as 
they did. Most historians argue that the eventual collapse of supplies to the Confederate military 
was not due to the failure of blockade runners, but instead the collapse of the Southern railroad 
system (Tucker 2006:110). The change in trade due to the blockade disrupted standard patterns 
and increased the burden on the Southern railroad network. Overall, the Union blockade of 
southern ports was an effective use of Northern resources (Underwood 2003:112). 
As stated earlier, the vessels used as blockade runners varied greatly, and as the war 
progressed, modifications were made to navigate the blockade more efficiently. A blockade 
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runner needed to be able to outrun a Union blockader, carry a heavy load, and often maneuver 
through rough, shallow waters. Both sailing and steam vessels were used throughout the war, but 
as the war progressed, several innovations would be made to steamships forever altering the 
world of shipping. Small sailing vessels were used at the beginning of the war and were able to 
withstand the dangers of blockade running longer than some steamships because of the harsh 
environment in areas like the Gulf. A majority of these successful sailing vessels were 
schooners; they had a shallow draught. They were generally very weatherly better suited for the 
harsh environment of the Gulf of Mexico (Cochran 1958:202). As the Union blockade became 
more effective, sailing vessels, like schooners, would be replaced with steamships. Steamships 
offered a blockade runner the ability to travel without having to worry about wind as well as 
more cargo hold. Unfortunately, the quest for profit would lead several steamship operators to 
become reckless, often burning fuels other than coal, which in turn would cause boilers to 
explode, losing both life and profit (Roberts 2004:107).  
The primary item exported was cotton, and many overland routes sprang up between 
Texas towns and Mexican cities, such as the one between Matamoros and Brownsville (Hoekstra 
1951:20). “The South counted on what the period newspapers called King Cotton Diplomacy,” 
where cotton bonds became essential for Confederate efforts abroad (Whisker 2002:16). The port 
of Tampico was a point of entry for arms and munitions that were hauled by wagons into Texas 
(Thomason 1968:16). Shipments of goods such as cotton went through Eagle Pass to Monterrey 
and then to Matamoros or Veracruz (Hoekstra 1951:20). Trade routes between London and 
Matamoros, as well as New York and Matamoros, were established. Cotton, goods, and 
ammunition made their way back and forth between Europe and Mexico, and even between the 
North and South. The South was not able to supply their soldiers with sufficient enough arms 
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and munitions; therefore, supplies were purchased overseas; these included Enfield rifles made at 
the London Armory Company and Austrian Lorenz rifles (Whiskers 2002:24-5). Due to the 
nature of the blockade, common and luxurious goods became more expensive (Thomason 
1968:3). 
 Profits of vast proportions could be made by blockade runners, who purchased cotton 
along the Rio Grande for six to ten cents a pound and then sold it in Europe for fifty to sixty 
cents a pound (Whisker 2002:17). The Enfield rifles, manufactured and purchased in Britain, 
originally cost around twenty-one dollars. Still, the Confederacy purchased them for fifty dollars, 
and buyers in Matamoros were charged up to sixty dollars (Irby 1977:17). In Texas and the 
South, prices of goods were extremely high; flour cost up to twenty-two dollars per pound, tea 
was four to five dollars per pound, coffee was one dollar per pound, sugar was twenty-five cents 
per pound, black pepper was one dollar per pound, rice was forty cents per pound and five 
pounds of potatoes was one dollar (Thomason 1968:20). 
 During the Civil War, salt became increasingly difficult to come by for both Union and 
Confederate forces. In response to this, saltworks began to appear along the coastlines that were 
difficult for Union blockaders to patrol. Salt was another popular exported item, especially along 
the coast of Florida. Before the Civil War, most Southern salts came from Virginia, Kentucky, 
Florida, and Texas, but only 0.1 million bushels came from the Florida coastline (Buker 
1993:47). Salt was so desperately needed that entrepreneurs would aim to control salt production 
and therefore raise the prices to obscene levels. The south counted on Texas and Florida for salt 
production after the fall of other southern states such as Louisiana. To derive salt from natural 
sources was labor intensive and weather dependent. Boiling salt down from saltwater was 
achieved without having to sink a well or worry about impurities forming on the surface of salt 
32 
 
ponds like that of El Sol del Rey in Hidalgo County in Texas. According to Lonn (1965:30-31), 
no other state played such a large part in the enterprise of salt as did Florida because of the many 
miles of protected and secluded bays, poverty, cheap fuel from brush, and access to brine without 
the labor of digging wells. Saltworks would vary in tools and style, but most often boilers, 
kettles, and pans would be used to gather and boil down water for salt (Bacha-Garza, Miller, and 
Skowronek 2019:191). 
There were several ways of extracting salt, and seawater was the easiest to access from 
within surface waters along Florida’s extensive shoreline dotted with secluded inlets and bays, 
which were difficult for larger vessels to navigate (Buker 1993:47). In fact, “one man succeeded 
in getting a ‘corner’ on all available salt in West Florida in 1861” and sold it for high prices 
(Lonn 1965:36). By mid-1863, Florida had several saltworks installations between St. Andrew 
Bay and Deadman’s Bay, which became a target for East Gulf Coast Blockading force (Buker 
1993:49) (Figure 2.3). 
 
FIGURE 2.3. The Salt Coast, St. Andrew Bay to Deadman’s Bay (Buker 1993:48). 
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Blockade Running in the Gulf of Mexico 
The Rio Grande, bordering Texas and Mexico, flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. It was not 
navigable; however, the mouth of the river was blocked by sandbars, and it was too shallow for 
vessels to cross them and travel up river for trade. To sail a vessel through the shallow waters of 
the ports along the Gulf coastline blockade runners, like the Scotsman Captain William Watson, 
were forced to modify the construction of their sailing vessels. It was important that the vessels 
were fast, had shallow draught, and were seaworthy. The model schooner was referred to as 
“flat-sharp” and was an adaptation of centre-board construction (Watson 2001:4). The 
proportions needed to be strictly followed for it to be both stable and seaworthy. A schooner 
built with these modifications was able to withstand shallow waters and high seas without 
capsizing. Watson’s schooner, Rob Roy, was built to these specifications and well suited to cross 
the shallow waters, sandbars, rivers, and shallow bays along the Texas and Mexican coasts. Rob 
Roy was twenty-two and a half feet wide and seventy-eight feet long with schooner rigging 
(Underwood 2003:57). His crew included four seamen, a cabin boy, a cook, mate, and of course, 
the captain himself (Watson 2001:6). 
 Rob Roy was of British registry, registered in British Honduras, and had no hailing port 
(Watson 2001:11-12). Any vessel that was not commissioned by the Confederate or Union Navy 
was likely to have a higher risk at sea and, therefore, would fly their vessels under foreign flags, 
usually the British flag (Watson 2001:13). On its first voyage, Rob Roy was loaded with cargo 
and a couple of passengers from New Orleans and headed for the port of Belize than to 
Matamoros (Watson 2001:14). The journey from Belize to Matamoros took a total of six days, 
and because this was early in the war, Watson and his crew were not interrupted by the Union 
blockade as they sailed into the Rio Grande (Watson 2001:16). The Federal forces were not yet 
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aware of the vulnerability the Rio Grande was to their cause. The major ports within the 
Confederate States were firmly blockaded, and it was dangerous for vessels to break through, 
though some were successful (Watson 2001:19). 
 According to Watson, no vessel drawing more than four and a half feet could enter the 
mouth of the Rio Grande. Rob Roy, drawing four feet with cargo, was able to anchor within ferry 
distance of Matamoros. Once a port charge and a duty of twelve and a half percent were paid on 
all the imported cargo to the Mexican Government, then Watson or any other blockade runner 
could unload their vessels. The goods would be discharged in Matamoros, where the Mexican 
Government would charge another twelve and a half percent for the exportation of goods and 
then ferried across the Rio Grande to Brownsville, Texas. Once the cargo had reached 
Brownsville and was officially in the Confederate States, they would be transported hundreds of 
miles to either Austin or Houston. This was a treacherous route, and many lives and cargo would 
be lost along the way. Despite the cost and labor, it took for goods to travel this route “the 
demand for goods in the Confederate States, and the still greater demand for cotton outside, was 
so great that the quantity of goods imported and cotton exported by this route was incredible” 
(Watson 2001:21). 
 The route to the mouth of the Rio Grande held its dangers and was difficult to cross 
successfully, but entering other ports along the Texas coast could be even more treacherous. 
Another blockade runner, Thomas E. Taylor and captain of Banshee II, provides an 
understanding of the dangers faced when breaking past the blockade and entering Galveston. 
Banshee II was a steamer purchased by the Confederate forces to run blockades and was unfit for 
its duties. The vessel was a second-hand Irish cattle boat, and its condition at the time of 
purchase was deplorable. “Her [sic] boilers were nearly worn out; her engines had been sadly 
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neglected; and added to this, she drew far too much water from the hazardous entrances of 
blockaded ports” (Taylor 2015:9).  
On a run from Havana to Galveston in January 1865, Banshee II was caught in a 
hurricane. As they made their way through torrential rains and black skies in the darkness, they 
found themselves amidst a blockading squadron (Taylor 2015:48). To avoid capture, several 
blockade runners would travel in darkness or paint their ships white to camouflage them. When 
Banshee II made a second attempt at entering Galveston, they were faced with treacherous 
waters of the Texas coast. The ship only lay three fathoms above water and could not lay anchor 
as it would not stick. The shallow waters caused damage to their vessel, and they were forced to 
return to deeper waters. Banshee II, a steamer, had used too much fuel to be able to return to 
Havana and was forced to make port in Galveston. By their third attempt, the blockading 
squadron was aware of their presence and began firing upon them. A narrow shoal between 
Banshee II and the squadron meant that they had at least a half mile between them. The shoal 
and the wind allowed Banshee II to escape though they had received damage and had at least one 
wounded crew member. The worst was to come as they entered the white waters and bumped 
through the shallows. This would be Taylor's last run at the blockade as the war was winding 
down, and it was clear that Banshee II was not a safe vessel to maintain many more successful 
campaigns.  
Rob Roy would continue to run successful blockading campaigns until the end of the war. 
In 1865 Watson sold Rob Roy to a new captain in Havana for a total of 3,500 dollars. This new 
captain intended to continue blockade running as Rob Roy was perfectly adapted to the 
treacherous waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In 1865 months after the purchase, Watson would 
learn of Rob Roy’s capture and destruction (Watson 2001:284-5). Watson served the remainder 
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of his time in the war in the service of the Confederate Navy aboard the steamer Phoenix which 
was stationed in Galveston (Watson 2001:288). 
 
Schooners of the Nineteenth Century 
In June of 1863, the Gulf Coast was populated by blockade runners that were either privately 
owned or hired by the Confederate government to carry goods from port to port and defend the 
Southern cause against the superior Union Navy. Though the Union Navy lacked effectiveness at 
the outbreak of the war, by the time Rob Roy embarked on its career in 1862, the Anaconda Plan 
was in full effect for almost two years, and the Union blockaders were well versed in the 
capturing of blockade runners. Though blockade runners came in all shapes and sizes, it was 
easier for smaller sailing vessels to navigate the rough, shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Some of the best suited vessels were coasting centerboard schooners. Near the end of the war, 
however, these small sailing vessels would be replaced by steamships that traveled at faster 
speeds and moved without depending on the weather.  
Schooners have a long history of maneuvering well in shallow waters in various 
environments, whether that be in the Great Lakes, along the Atlantic coast, within the Gulf of 
Mexico, or the Caribbean Sea. A schooner-rigged vessel is perhaps one of the most used and, in 
turn, the most developed. “No one knows how many schooners have existed or how many 
variations have been developed for different trades and waters” (Cullen 1974:140). Once a vessel 
was in use, it was often shifted from trade to trade as economic interests changed, all the while 
modifications would be made as necessary. This was the case with Rob Roy. Rob Roy “had the 
appearance of an ordinary trading schooner of the clipper build” (Watson 2001:6) and was 78 
feet long, 22.5 feet wide, with a depth of hold at about 6 feet. Initially, schooners were used as 
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yachting vessels. Still, over time they became cargo vessels as they were light, shallow drafted, 
and able to maneuver quickly on inland waterways as well as out in the open ocean (MacGregor 
1997:12).  
The term schooner was first used to define a small, easily handled vessel and is rumored 
to have appeared in about 1713 when a vessel was launched, and someone yelled: “Oh, how she 
[sic] scoons!” (MacGregor 1997:17), “scoon” being a Scots word meaning to skip along the 
surface of the water. Eventually, a schooner was identified by the placement of its sails and a 
smaller hull, which of course, varied greatly. The schooner is identifiable by its distinct masts, 
which rake aft. Schooners have two masts, and the types vary based on their sail configuration 
(MacGregor 1982:10-11) (Figure 2.4). 
The schooner is thought to originate from both sides of the Atlantic, in England and 
colonial America. American and British schooners can be further classified into two separate 
groups within each country. The two types in the American tradition were the ocean-going 
schooner and the smaller inshore craft (MacGregor 1997:21). The British tradition shared similar 
classes of the vessel; the smaller of which would be referred to as shallop on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The main difference between the American and British shallop type was that the latter 
were generally smaller, but both types were “rigged with gaff sails or spritsails, and with the 
foremast stepped right up in the eyes of the boat” (MacGregor 1997:21). The larger schooners 
were similar in both boat building traditions; they were more substantial with the addition of 
square topsails and topgallant sails used both fore and aft (MacGregor 1982:32).  
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FIGURE 2.4. Labeled sails of a schooner type vessel (MacGregor 1997:49). 
 The American tradition evolved slightly over time, and by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, a standard proportion of length to beam was identified as successful for coastal and 
inland waterway sailing. By the mid-1800s, steamboats had taken over as packet vessels, and 
two- to three-masted schooners were used for freighting (or fishing) with a fore-and-aft rigging, 
as was preferred by coastal vessels because they could be sailed by smaller crews and in quicker 
times. These fore-and-aft schooners were rare in Great Britain but were almost preferred on the 
East Coast of North America (MacGregor 1997:70). Some of the earliest built clipper schooners 
were designed for fisheries and were keel schooners often fit with centerboards (Chapelle 
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1973:83). The first recorded account of a vessel fitted with a centerboard (Figure 2.5) was in 
New Jersey in 1811 (Barkhausen 1990:9). 
 
FIGURE 2.5. Centreboard Construction Plan for Clipper City (Barkhausen 1990:12). 
The centerboard was placed off the center of the keel and hung on a bolt four-fifths from 
the aft-end, which allowed it to pivot on a fixed point that kept it from getting caught when it 
struck bottom (Barkhausen 1990:9). A good example of a successful clipper-built flat-bottomed 
centerboard schooner used in intercoastal waterways is Sunny South, 1855 (Figure 2.6). 
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FIGURE 2.6. Sunny South, oyster schooner, 1855, half model (Chapelle 1973:85). 
Sunny South was registered as 71 feet long, 22.33 feet wide, and 5.25 feet depth of hold, 
and represented stock version of future oyster schooners along the East and Gulf coasts. Sunny 
South was rumored to be a very fast boat with “a small sheer, straight keel with small drag, 
moderate rake of sternpost, round tuck, upper-and-lower transom square stern, the stem curved, 
raking and flaring of the rabbet” (Chapelle 1973:83-86). The flat-bottom design allowed the 
vessel to sit shallow in the water, adding to its speed and maneuverability in inland waterways. 
For a flat-bottomed vessel to function successfully, it must have a longer length to width ratio, 
with enough flare on the sides to keep it from capsizing in rough waters (Chapelle 1973; Culler 
1974; MacGregor 1997; Watson 2001). This specific design became popular for blockade 





A blockade is a military tactic used for hundreds of years, and though its use was not unique, the 
way the blockade was carried out during the American Civil War was. The war was fought 
between brothers and was a struggle within a nation that shared numerous borders. Not only was 
it difficult to defend the borders from within, but once the blockade was declared, it was difficult 
for both the Union and Confederacy to establish a naval force big enough to defend their own 
causes. The United States had a meager navy at the onset of the war and, through the four bloody 
years, were able to establish a strong naval force. Once the Union was able to defend Lincoln’s 
Anaconda Plan, it became the goal of the South to find a way to break the blockade and continue 
trade with outside investors to fund their war efforts. As a result, blockade running became a 
lucrative business for outside investors and an integral part of the Confederacy’s ability to 
withstand the blockade for so long. 
 The blockading force was broken into four sections, two along the Atlantic Coast and two 
along the Gulf Coast. The massive extent of the southern coast was difficult for the Union forces 
to defend, but through a focused defense of important ports, they were able to hold their own. 
Those blockade runners willing to risk it all for the hope of profit found creative ways to 
circumvent the blockading force. In the Gulf, this meant that blockade runners would utilize 
small sailing vessels that could enter shallow ports along the coasts of Texas and Florida. Other 
ports along the coast like New Orleans and Mobile were essential to the success of the South but 
were also better defended by Union forces.  
 One of the most successful blockade runners in the Gulf of Mexico was Captain William 
Watson, who captained the centerboard schooner, Rob Roy. Schooners were effective vessels in 
maneuvering the blockade in the Gulf of Mexico. Under his command, this small vessel was able 
to enter several ports along the Texas coast and even Mexico. Rob Roy successfully evaded 
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capture on two separate occasions transporting various war goods like weapons, cotton, and 
medical supplies. From 1863 until Rob Roy was scuttled and burned off the coast of Florida, the 
vessel was able to run the blockade successfully thirteen times. 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHODS AND SURVEY 
According to Watson, Rob Roy was scuttled and burned on 2 March 1865 in Deadman’s Bay, 
Florida. Beginning in 1864, navigational charts of the area indicate that there were remains of 
shipwrecks, including an “old boiler”. In 1978 salvagers collected items from a wreck site in this 
region and claimed it to be from Rob Roy (Barnette 2003:124). Subsequently, researchers from 
East Carolina University conducted work on two sites within this region. Is one of these sites the 
remains of Rob Roy or another Civil War vessel? Do the artifacts recovered by the sports divers 
correspond with the vessels of this era? The methodology for answering these questions includes 
historical, theoretical, and archaeological investigations. Here the archaeological methods are 
briefly discussed along with the results of the archaeological survey. 
 
Archaeological Survey Methods 
Two stages of fieldwork were conducted for this project. The first stage of fieldwork data was 
collected by East Carolina University’s Advanced Methods Class in March 2017 (McKinnon 
2017). That original data influenced the second stage of fieldwork conducted in November 2018. 
The primary goal of the 2018 fieldwork was to dive on targets identified during the preliminary 
survey using the 2017 magnetometer and side scan sonar data. After verifying which sites were 
most relevant to this thesis, it was roughly mapped and photographically documented.  
Preliminary Survey 
The goal of the preliminary survey completed in 2017 was to reassess two anomalies from a 
survey completed in 2016. The two anomalies included “Target 0284 and Target 0285” (Figure 
3.1), which were loosely identified with what NOAA charts referred to as “old boiler” or 
“obstruction” (Figure 3.2). The two anomalies were chosen after oral reports, and Barnette’s 
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(2003:124) compilation of wrecks in Florida suggested that treasure hunters in 1978 had 
identified Rob Roy and sold artifacts from the wreckage found in Deadman’s Bay. According to 
these reports, Rob Roy was located between markers #4 and #5 at the mouth of the river, where 
small sections of the wooden hull, brass spikes, pottery, a single porthole, and lead ballast was 
recovered (Barnett 2003:124). 




FIGURE 3.2. Old boiler marked on chart (NOAA 1971). 
Remote sensing for the preliminary survey was conducted in the Steinhatchee River 
channel that opens into Deadman’s Bay. The field crew used ECU’s 24ft Carolina Skiff, 
Flounder, and gathered side scan and magnetometer readings (McKinnon 2017:8). The magnetic 
data was gathered with a Geometrics G882 cesium magnetometer utilizing Hypack 2015 
Hydrographic Survey software. The positional data was collected with a Trimble AcGPS unit. 
The lines were spaced evenly at about 10-meter intervals or about 33 feet. The survey was run in 
both North/South and East/West patterns to complete a full grid of the area surrounding the 
designated targets. The vessel towed the magnetometer at about 12 meters behind, maintaining a 
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speed of approximately 3-4 knots. As the water was rather shallow, the magnetometer was 
floated using a mixture of foam materials attached with duct tape. The resulting data gathered 
was run through both Hypack and Magpick software and resulted in a shaded relief map with 
gradient colors (McKinnon 2017:10).  
The sonar data was gathered with a side-scan sonar unit, the Marine Sonics 600kHz, and 
processed information through SeaScan PC and SonarWiz5 software. The sonar was mounted on 
the same side as the magnetometer (starboard) and remained approximately 0.6 or 2ft above the 
ocean floor. The lanes were spaced equal 10-meter distances like the magnetometer, and the 
sonar was run at about 2.5 knots. The results, like the magnetometer data, were exported into 
ArcMap, and both sets of data were overlaid to gain more information.  
The results of side scan and magnetometer surveys showed three main anomalies, two of 
which were congruent with the known magnetic anomalies of the 2016 survey work and the “old 
boiler” or “obstruction” identified in the NOAA charts. Of the contacts provided in the 2017 
report, Contact 0002 (Figure 3.3), Contact 0005 (Figure 3.4), and Contact 0007 (Figure 3.5) 
would become the targets of interest for the 2018 field survey. 
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FIGURE 3.3. Contact 0002 from side scan sonar survey 2017 (McKinnon 2017:32). 
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FIGURE 3.4. Contact 0005 from side scan sonar survey 2017 (McKinnon 2017:34). 
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Diving the Side Scan Targets 
Diving on previously collected targets and completing a site survey were prioritized due to 
adverse weather conditions and time constraints. The data from the Spring of 2017 fieldwork 
was referenced, and three points were chosen for investigation. These three points, Contact 0002 
(Figure 3.3), Contact 0005 (Figure 3.4), and Contact 0007 (Figure 3.5), were chosen because of 
their congruence with historical research. The next phase was diving on the targets chosen from 
the side scan sonar data. This was carried out using self-contained breathing apparatus (SCUBA) 
following the ECU Dive Office safety rules and regulations. The three targets were investigated 
to decide if they were relevant to this study and to gather detailed data. After each target was 
reviewed, Contact 0002 and Contact 0007 were deemed unnecessary for this thesis because 
Contact 0002 had no artifacts present, and Contact 0007 was a different view of the third contact. 
The third, Contact 0005, required further investigation, and additional data was gathered. 
Photographic Survey 
A photographic survey was conducted on Contact 0005 of the side scan targets to better 
document the details found. As Green states in his technical handbook, photography is a practical 
method for recording detailed information underwater (Green 2004:217). Photographs were 
gathered with an Olympus Tough TG-3 waterproof camera, and video was recorded using a 
GoPro Hero3 first edition. A thirty to forty-minute dive was dedicated to gathering photographic 
data. All photos included a one-meter scale for reference. Due to diving conditions, the 
photographic survey proved to be of poor quality and could not provide clear information for this 




FIGURE 3.6. One-meter scale photography of Contact 0005 (Photo by Bernard, 2018). 
Survey Map 
Along with photography, site plan surveys play an essential role in understanding and recording 
an archaeological site. Site plan survey maps are dependent on on-site conditions (Green 
2004:88). Unfortunately, diving conditions were not favorable during the survey, with below 
sixty-degree air and water temperatures. As such, a rough site plan, or mud map, was drawn in 
place of a scaled site drawing. The rough field map includes measurements of the span of the 
wreck site, as well as measurements of distinct features that would help in the identification and 








FIGURE 3.8. Boiler Site Sketch (Drawn by Borrelli, 2018). 
 
The Archaeological Investigation 
According to Watson`s memoir, Rob Roy ran aground and was scuttled near Suwannee River 
while other reports suggest the vessel was run aground and burned near Steinhatchee River; 
however, all sources agree the final resting place of Rob Roy is somewhere within Deadman’s 
Bay Florida (Watson 2001:286; Stewart 1903:825; Buker 1993:38, 95-97; Singer 1998:241; 
Barnette 2003:124; Gaines 2008:41, 44). Field investigations conducted by students of ECU’s 
Program in Maritime Studies of Steinhatchee in previous seasons found anomalies in 
magnetometer data that suggested evidence of a possible wreck site associated with Rob Roy or 
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Havana, another Civil War blockade runner. One anomaly was referred to on several renditions 
of NOAA charts as an “old boiler” (Figure 3.9) and deserved further investigation. The anomaly 
was investigated in November 2018 to determine if it was associated with Rob Roy.  Upon 
completion of the field work, the object was confirmed to be a boiler of some kind. Still, its 
actual character had to be determined before the association, or lack of association with Rob Roy 
could be confirmed. Rob Roy was a sailing vessel and was not equipped with a boiler at the time 
of sinking though it was carrying farm equipment, therefore, the boiler could have still been 
associated with the vessel. The other vessel, Havana, was a Confederate screw steamer 
measuring 115 ft 4 inches in length with a beam of 22.5 inches and was reportedly carrying lead 
and cotton when it was captured (Gaines 2008:41). It was, therefore, necessary to investigate the 
size and structure of the boiler to identify if it held any association with the vessels. 
 
FIGURE 3.9. NOAA Chart of Deadman’s Bay 1971.  
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During the field portion of this thesis, video, and photographs, as well as sketches with 
rough measurements, were taken. The boiler was observed in a shallow environment, and 
because it is placed near the mouth of Steinhatchee River as it flows into Deadman’s Bay, the 
water was rather choppy. The choppy water created low visibility, which made it challenging to 
gather clear photos. The sketch (Figure 3.10) is a plan view of the boiler wreckage, which had 
little to no visible debris field. The debris field appeared to span less than a few feet from the 
bulk of the boiler. No probing was conducted in the area, and so it is unclear if the wreck site 
spans further than what is presented in the sketch.  
 
FIGURE 3.10. Sketch of Boiler in Deadman’s Bay (Drawn by Jason Raupp, 2018). 
 The wreckage measured 5.6 meters (approximately 20 feet) in length and about 3.6 
meters (approximately 12 feet) wide. The exterior of the boiler was broken away, exposing what 
appeared to be several fire tubes, a steam tube, and the firebox measuring 1.4 meters 
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(approximately 5 feet) by 1.1 meters (approximately 4 feet). Four fire tubes were defined, and 
partial pieces of a fifth were exposed. A small lead lined pipe lay at the southeast corner of the 
wreck with a rope attached. The rope appeared to be relatively modern, and it was unclear if the 
pipe was once a part of the wreckage. Surrounding the boiler within a few feet were pieces of 
metal plating that appeared to have broken off from the boiler. At the southwest corner of the 
wreckage, the circular end of the cylindrical section of the boiler lay vertical to the sea floor and 
appeared to rise approximately 3 ft from the sea floor with a diameter of 4 to 5ft. Also exposed in 
the wreckage were rivets (Figure 3.11), and a section in the lower part of the boiler appeared to 
be charred.  
 
FIGURE 3.11. Photograph of Boiler Rivets in Deadman’s Bay (Taken by author, 2018). 
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  The most defining features of this boiler is its smaller size, the presence of rivets, and the 
type of metal used. Based on the appearance of the metal, including its rather rough texture and 
the way in which the metal was rusting, the boiler appeared to be made of wrought iron, but 
without further testing, this cannot be stated with total assurance. The presence of rivets and the 
material used places this artifact within a possible time frame conducive to the Civil War. 
 A steam-boiler is identified by both form and construction; they include stationary, 
locomotive, and marine boilers (Peabody and Miller 1910:1). Boilers vary in size and internal 
structure; they can be horizontal or vertical and become more complex over time. By the 1860s, 
the two most common boilers for marine applications were the tubular boiler and return flue 
boiler (Bisbee 2018:16). Due to the qualities of the boiler located in Deadman’s Bay, certain 
types of boilers are ruled out, including Locomotive-boilers and Scotch Boilers. The most 
defining characteristics of locomotive boilers are their small tubes with diameters of 2 or fewer 
inches, allowing for a closer grouping and increased number of tubes within the cylinder 
(Peabody and Miller 1910:19). Scotch Boilers (Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13) were standardized 
over time and included somewhere between 300 to 330 tubes with 2.5 inches to 3-inch diameters 
(Meyer 1920:A117). In the boiler located within Deadman’s Bay, only four tubes and part of a 




FIGURE 3.12. Standardized Scotch Boiler (Meyer 1920:A117). 
 




Cylindrical Tubular Boilers (Figure 3.14) consist of a cylindrical shell enclosed at each 
end with flat tube-plates and have several fire-tubes with 3 to 4-inch diameters. They are 
equipped with a manhole on top and a hand-hole near the bottom to make cleaning easy. The 
placement of the feed-pipe varies as does the blow-off pipe. The front of these boilers are often 
made with cast iron, and there are large doors that open to the smokebox (Peabody and Miller 
1910:2-6). The main difference between the Cylindrical Tubular Boiler and the Cylindrical Flue-
Boiler (Figure 3.15) is the replacement of dozens or hundreds of small fire-tubes with fewer 
large flues. Flue-boilers are generally larger than the tubular boiler, which was more compact, 
but their exteriors looked similar (Peabody and Miller 1910:5-6; Bisbee 2018:16-17). The flue 
boiler was most common during the Civil War while the tubular boiler “was just coming into its 
own” (Bisbee 2018:17), but both were utilized in Confederate ironclads.  
 




FIGURE 3.15. Cylindrical Two-Flue Boiler (Peabody and Miller 1910:6). 
Boilers of this era were held together with rivets; the type of rivet would vary from boiler 
to boiler. The rivets found on the “old boiler” had a dome shaped head like pressure and button 
rivets as well as those especially designed by the International Engineering Company. Rivets 
used in boilers had to be designed to withstand high pressure. According to the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers, certain rivet heads were created to best suit high pressure conditions 
(Figure 3.16). Cone head rivets were the most common commercial rivets which came directly 
from a manufacturer while Steeple head rivets were the usual form of hand-driven rivets (Haven 
and Swett 1923:86). Pressure head rivets were most widely used in machine riveting, and the 
rivet designed by the International Engineering Company was created for their boiler shop. The 
button head rivet was the most common form of structural rivet heads. When spacing, the 
structural space was limited full countersunk, and flat countersunk rivets would be used instead. 
If a rivet were to be subjected to extreme vibration, a swell neck would be used while straight 
neck rivet heads were most suited to pre-drilled holes. The flat head rivet would be used in close 
quarters and could not be exposed to external heat (Haven and Swett 1923:88-89). As this list 
illustrates, a rivet head would be chosen based on the need for construction. Structures designed 
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to be under high pressure would best be constructed using a dome shaped headed rivets such as 
found within the “old boiler.” 
 
FIGURE 3.16. Chart of Standard Proportions of Rivet Heads (Haven and Swett 1923:87). 
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The archaeological investigation of the “old boiler” suggests that the object is not clearly 
associated with the wreck of Rob Roy and closely resembles the structure of flue boilers 
commonly used during the Civil War. It is not clear if the boiler is associated with the wreck of 
Havana or possibly associated with the many salt works that were set up along the coast during 
the Civil War. There is no historical evidence providing the type of boiler used aboard Havana. 
Reports simply refer to the cargo aboard the vessel, including the 10 tons of lead that melted and 
sank along with the steamer (Stewart 1903:262). The absence of melted lead surrounding the 
“old boiler” rules out the possibility of it being associated with Havana. 
Given the small size of the boiler, it could have been used by one of the many saltworks 
set up along the coast during the Civil War (pers.comm. Saxon Bisbee November 2018).  
During the Civil War, salt became increasingly difficult to come by for both Union and 
Confederate forces. In response to this, saltworks began to appear along the coastlines that were 
difficult for Union blockaders to defend. Salt became so desperately needed that entrepreneurs 
would aim to control salt production and therefore raise the prices to obscene levels. In fact, “one 
man succeeded in getting a “corner” on all available salt in West Florida in 1861” and sold it for 
high prices (Lonn 1965:36). This is, of course, only one account, but like blockade runners, salt 
workers were willing to make a profit from the sale of contraband materials. The boilers used for 
saltworks varied according to what was made available. Without further investigation, the 
identification of the boiler and what it is associated with will remain unclear. 
 
Post-Survey Analysis 
Following the results of the 2018 fieldwork, it was deemed necessary to complete an additional 
phase of research and analysis. The collected data could not conclusively identify the wreckage 
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as Rob Roy nor could it be associated with the steamer Havana, therefore a spatial analysis was 
conducted. The goal of the spatial analysis was to create a predictive modeling map of the West 
Coast of Florida as well as a visual representation of the movements of Rob Roy to assist in an 
historical, archaeological analysis of the vessel as a blockade runner. 
Geographical Information System 
The use of ArcGIS has become a common tool amongst archaeologists as it provides a way for 
geographic information to be processed and displayed in a clear manner. The tool can be used to 
create maps of archaeological sites prior to and after archaeological investigations. In Spatial 
Technology and Archaeology: The Archaeological Applications of GIS, Wheatley, and Gillings 
(2002:177) discuss the use of georeferencing as a successful predictive modeling tool. In this 
thesis, georeferencing was used as a post-survey method to provide possible explanations for the 
discrepancies in the historical record. 
Maps and Charts 
The US Coast Guard began recording the coastline prior to the American Civil War. The first 
chart utilized was NOAAs “United States-Gulf Coast Florida, Horseshoe Point to Rock Islands 
1985 (Figure 3.17),” which was the basemap for the georeferencing project; this map was closest 
to the reported salvage of Rob Roy. Four other maps and charts were used to overlay the 1985 
chart. These included: United States Coast and Geodetic Survey “Coast Chart No.180 Cedar 
Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1864” (Figure 3.18), Department of Commerce chart “United 
States-Gulf Coast Florida Horseshoe Point to Rock Islands”(Figure 3.19), Department of 
Commerce chart “United States-Gulf Coast Cedar Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1935”(Figure 
3.20), and finally the United States Coast Survey Office “Northern Part of Florida 1864”(Figure 
3.21). These maps and charts were used to provide a wide variance of time and encompass the 
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desired geographical locations used to create a georeferenced map.
 
















FIGURE 3.21. Northern Part of Florida 1864 Map (NOAA 2018). 
Georeferenced Map 
To complete a successful georeferenced map, nautical maps of the Florida West coast were 
collected. To create the most accurate representation of the changes in the coastline, it was 
important to have geographic maps of the area the Civil War up to the present. Once the maps 
were located, they were georeferenced and used to analyze the possible wreck site of Rob Roy.  
 The first step in creating a georeferenced map is finding a base map for the overlay maps 
to georeference accurately. The first map from 1985 was uploaded into the program as a JPEG 
file and referenced to the North American 1927 (NAD27) datum (Figure 3.22). Following this 
procedure, the oldest chart dating to 1861 using bathymetric data was georeferenced to the 
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original map (Figure 3.23). This was completed by adding control points to the original JPEG. 
Control points were more accurately placed using the Georeferencing toolbar and image viewer. 
At this step, it was important to ensure that data points were placed in areas that would be less 
affected by geological changes through time. Once the second map, the oldest map, was 
georeferenced to the first map, the most recent, three more maps dating from 1930, 1950, and 
1864 were georeferenced using similar procedures (Figure 3.24, Figure 3.25, and Figure 3.26). 
The final map was the only one used in this process that did not utilize bathymetric data to 
create; because of this, it was the most difficult to georeference and required additional steps to 
add (Figure 3.26). 





FIGURE 3.23. Georeferencing the 1861 Chart to the Basemap (Taken by Bernard, 2018). 
 




FIGURE 3.25. Georeferencing the 1930 Chart (Taken by Bernard, 2018). 
 





It was necessary to employ various methods to gather the best and manage the information found 
during the archaeological investigation and historical research. The historical, archaeological, 
and geospatial information employed in this thesis required various levels of application. The 
results of the applied methodology are provided in the following chapter. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF GULF BLOCKADE RUNNING 
SAIL VS STEAM 
This study examines the life and times of Rob Roy, a Civil War blockade runner through 
archaeological and historical research. This analysis provides a discussion of Rob Roy as a 
blockade runner, including a comparative analysis of the vessel’s relative success within the Gulf 
of Mexico. In addition to the analysis, this section will review the archaeological data collected 
during the fieldwork at Deadman’s Bay.  
It is paramount to have a comprehensive history of the artifact to understand how Rob 
Roy (Figure 4.1) influenced socioeconomic interactions and contributed to the overall 
understanding of blockade runners within the Gulf of Mexico during the Civil War. Rob Roy 
became a blockade runner after several Confederate ports were already captured and controlled 
by Union forces. By the spring of 1862, ports along the southern coast captured by Union forces 
were lost, including Beaufort, South Carolina, Jacksonville and St. Augustine, Florida, and 
Brunswick, Georgia (Wise 1988:63). Other southern ports, including Savannah and New 
Orleans, were starting to feel the grip of the Anaconda Plan. As the grip tightened, blockade 
runners were forced to look elsewhere along the coastline to transport much needed Confederate 
goods. Ports that held no direct ties to Confederate or Union causes remained neutral and were 
accessed by blockade runners and investors of all nationalities. These ports included Spanish 
Havana, and British Bermuda and Nassau. Blockade runners that joined in the lucrative and 
dangerous enterprise at the beginning of the war were forced to enter the “backdoor” around the 
time that Rob Roy became involved.  
At the outbreak of the war, the Union navy was not well equipped to enforce the 
blockade, and the Confederacy was not equipped to break through. Each side was forced to 
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employ and convert older vessels to serve their cause. The most common vessel used to break 
the blockade was small coasting centerboard schooners, but by the end of the war, it was more 
common to see steamers used for blockade running. As the war came to an end, it became 
increasingly difficult for blockade runners (Table 4.1) and especially for sail as the seas were 
filled with faster, better made steamers (Table 4.2) (Lebergott 1987:873).  
 
FIGURE 4.1. Sketch of Rob Roy (Watson 2001:162). 
TABLE 4.1 CAPTURE RATES OF BLOCKADE RUNNERS IN PERCENT  
(Lebergott 1981:873) 
Year Steam Sail Combined Differential for 
Steam 
1861 0.3 4.9 3.1 -4.6 
1862 24.4 46.0 40.9 -21.6 
1863 13.4 43.5 27.1 -30.1 
1864 15.4 51.4 27.8 -36.0 
1865 16.7 71.1 32.7 -54.4 





TABLE 4.2 BLOCKADE RUNS AND CAPTURES  
(Lebergott 1981:879) 
Item 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 
Captures and Wrecks: U.S. Navy      
     Steam 5 76 110 81 23 
     Sail 191 281 275 144 47 
Percent Captures (Price)      
     Steam 0.3 24.4 13.4 15.4 16.7 
     Sail 4.9 46.0 43.5 51.4 71.1 
Attempted Runs to and from C.S.A.      
     Steam 1,693 311 821 526 138 
     Sail 3,898 611 632 280 66 
Export Captures: Percent with Cotton Cargo      
    Steam 0 62 76 92 75 
    Sail 14 79 92 96 94 
Cotton Cargoes: Successful Outward Runs      
    Steam 0 88 283 213 46 
    Sail 268 160 182 66 10 
 
Rob Roy as a Civil War Blockade Runner 
Rob Roy’s construction is reported to be sometime in June of 1863. One source cites the origins 
of the vessel as Norwich, Connecticut, but without historical, archaeological evidence, this is just 
conjecture, and the origins of the vessel remain unknown (Barnette 2003:124). What is known, is 
a detailed account of the time the vessel was held under the command of William Watson as well 
as the capture of Rob Roy by the Union blockading force at Deadman’s Bay in Florida. The first 
introductions to the vessel follow Watson’s purchase in 1862 and renaming of the vessel as it 
traveled to Belize, Honduras.  Watson’s (2001:6) account outlines that the vessel was a flat-sharp 
centerboard clipper-built schooner, which made it very seaworthy. The centerboard was in line 
with the keel and held in place by a strong king pin like Sunny South (Figure 4.2). Sunny South, 
which has no known association with Rob Roy, was a construction model built in 1855 and 
represented a model developed between 1830-1835, which maneuvered best in New England 
bays (Chapelle 1973:86). Though centerboard schooners lay shallow in the water, with cargo, 
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they functioned well and were useful when entering the shores of Southern States, especially 
along the Gulf of Mexico (Watson 2001:4-6).  
 
FIGURE 4.2. Sunny South (Chapelle 1973:85). 
 The vessel carried a crew of eight, including a captain, mate, cook, cabin boy, and four 
seamen, the perfect proportion of two men to a mast. Watson (2001:6) described the schooner as 
an “ordinary trading schooner of clipper build.” These clipper-built schooners were popular as 
North American fishing vessels because they were fast and allowed ample deck space for 
working (Chapelle 1973:74-75). When the vessel was loaded, it had a draught of 4 feet 9 inches 
and 13 feet when the centerboard was down. Watson (2001:6) states that the vessel shared 
similarities with schooners found on the American side of the Atlantic. The vessel was equipped 
with a trunk cabin, which rose about two feet above the main deck and was accessed through 
stairs facing the stern (Watson 2001:6). Schooners of this build were successful in shallow 
environments, especially within bays, and as a result, the design remained the same for about 
seventy years into the 1920s (Chapelle 1973:86). 
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  As the vessel traveled to British Honduras from New Orleans in 1862, it encountered the 
Confederate steamer Alabama (Figure 4.3). It exchanged information regarding the safety of the 
port with the steamer’s crew. CSS Alabama was a large wooden steam screw sloop sunk by USS 
Kearsarge on June 19, 1864, and though it served a successful career as a Confederate 
commerce raider, it only survived for two years (Gaines 2008:36). The officer on board Alabama 
recognized the schooner as a vessel that had served the Confederate cause in Mobile, Alabama, 
several times before. Rob Roy continued its journey from New Orleans with a couple of 
passengers and a small cargo to sell in British Honduras.  
In British Honduras, the schooner was renamed Rob Roy and registered as a British 
vessel. There is no clear documentation that provides historical evidence of what the vessel was 
named before it became Rob Roy. With its new identity in place, Rob Roy acquired a light freight 
and another passenger in addition to the two previous ones and made its way to Matamoros, 
Mexico. Thanks to its shallow draught and fair winds, it took only six days to travel from Belize 
to Matamoros. Matamoros, about 26 degrees N latitude, was on the edge of the trade winds 
making it a rather turbulent coast for vessels to rest (Watson 2001:17). Because the port of 
Matamoros lay further inland on the southern side of the Rio Grande, even shallow-drafted 
vessels had to be pulled across the sandbars by a smaller boat. Anything destined for Matamoros 
or Brownsville would have to be unloaded at the Brazos Santiago port because there was not 






FIGURE 4.3. Confederate sloop-of-war Alabama (Ellis 1973:170). 
 As Rob Roy waited for its next cargo, Watson traveled to the port of Bagdad off the coast 
of Texas (Figure 4.4), paid port duties, and discussed the cost of cotton with the Cotton Bureau 
as well as current affairs on both sides of the river. In 1863 Bagdad had become a destination for 
individuals to share in the profits of the current trade a far change from the fisherman shanties 
that populated the town before the outbreak of the American Civil War (Irby 1977:6).  After 
gaining its first cargo in Bagdad, Rob Roy would serve as a blockade runner under the command 
of William Watson. The vessel’s first run was from Matamoros to the Brazos River, which 





FIGURE 4.4. South Texas Coast from Cedar Bayou to the Rio Grande (Underwood 2003:9). 
Watson referred to each of his investors using initials. To assist in clarification within this 




TABLE 4.3 INVESTOR CHART INCLUDING APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OWNED 
BY EACH 
Investor Pseudonym Located Percentage 
Owned 
Sum Ship Or 
Cargo 













100% 13,500+ Cargo 
R. and D.G.M 
and Co.  
Martin and 
Co. 






of R. and 
D.G.M and Co. 
Mr. R. Martin Havana 50% Unknown Ship--Cargo 
  
To make its first run, Rob Roy had to gain a cargo, a new crew, and in turn, a new 
investor who became a partial owner of the vessel. The crew who first journeyed with Rob Roy 
from New Orleans were not the type to be involved in the “bold and daring enterprise” (Watson 
2001:34) of blockade running and, therefore, were replaced. To pay the passage of each crew 
member, their wages, and provide an advance in payment for the new crew was more than 
Watson could provide without selling the cargo, therefore, he accepted an offer from his first 
investor, a gentleman from Brownsville. The vessel and its cargo were now co-owned (Watson 
2001:35). With a new crew and captain, Rob Roy began its first adventure as a blockade runner 
heading for the Brazos River. While on its maiden voyage, the vessel met the three-masted 
schooner Kittitinie (or Kittatinny), a Union navy blockade vessel (Watson 2001:41). On 
September 24, 1863, the schooner Kittitinie was instructed to watch the Texas ports at Brazos 
River, Pass Cavallo, and Aransas for blockade running vessels filled with cotton (Stewart 
1987:602). Fortunately, Rob Roy was able to avoid capture and safely made its way to the Brazos 
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River and 30 miles up the river to Columbia, Texas, the acting port in the area. It is here that Rob 
Roy received its first injury as a blockade runner. 
 USS Virginia was given the same duty station as Kittatinny, placing the screw steamer 
along the Texas coast at the same time as Rob Roy (Stewart 1987:602). As Rob Roy neared the 
Confederate forts on the shores of the Brazos River, a large steamer similar to USS Virginia, 
bore down on the ship from about four miles to the east, unable to drift into the shallow waters it 
fired at Rob Roy. At first, a warning shot was fired, which fell short of the vessel. As the steamer 
approached Rob Roy, it continued to shoot and, as far as the crew aboard Rob Roy could tell, 
miss. Rob Roy was pulled over the sand bars by a small pilot vessel. When Rob Roy finally made 
it to shore, the crew realized that the vessel was struck on the starboard side, but at a point that 
kept the shot-hole above water. The vessel was careened, and the hole was filled with tarred 
oakum and covered with a strong tarred canvas, which was nailed on to stop the leak (Watson 
2001:47). Due to the leak, several items in the cargo, including cotton, were damaged, and 
because there was no way to ensure a blockade runner, it was an economic loss for the crew and 
owners. The surviving cargo included salt pork, crates of earthenware, nails, and ironmongery 
(Watson 2001:48). 
 Following this close call, Rob Roy underwent some repairs carried out by a local 
carpenter that once served in the Confederate forces with Watson. Both Watson and the 
carpenter were members of the Confederate Army serving in the same brigade at Corinth, 
Mississippi, after which the carpenter was taken prisoner in Vicksburg and unable to serve again. 
The carpenter shortened the masts of the vessel by creating a new heel for the keelson, wedging 
the slackened deck, and lightly wedging the masts. Finally, Rob Roy was re-rigged and loaded 
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with compressed cotton purchased from Houston. Lying nearby were three or four blockade-
running schooners waiting on similar tasks to be completed (Watson 2001:52).  
 By September 1863, several schooners that served as blockade runners had been captured 
or sunk by Union forces while trying to run the blockade along the Texas coast (Powel, Cordon, 
and Arnold 2012:332-333). Even with these losses, the port Sabine Pass was defended 
successfully by the Confederate forces giving the locals in Columbia cause to reinforce the 
Brazos River. To do this, the Confederate government impressed Rob Roy, even though several 
other suitable vessels were nearby. During its short impressment, Rob Roy reinforced the 
Confederate position at Fort Velasco by driving piles and placing obstructions throughout the 
river. While the vessel was employed, Watson headed to Houston to urge General Magruder to 
remove Rob Roy from impressment. Below are sections of the correspondence that followed 
Watson's visit to General Magruder: 
Letter from Major-General Magruder, C.S. Army, to the Confederate 
commissioner at London, transmitting copies of correspondence with the British 
consul at Galveston. 
Hdqrs. District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona 
Houston, Tex., October 22, 1863. 
Sir: I send you for your information a copy of a letter to the British consul 
at Galveston, in answer to one from him, a copy of which is also enclosed. 
The consul is so unfair in his statements as to justify on my part the belief that he 
is trying, out of small things, to create mischief. In case this correspondence is 
brought to the notice of the English Government, I beg that you will make such 
use of my letter as may seem best.  
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
J. Bankhead Magruder,  
Major-General, Commanding. 
Hon. James M. Mason, 
Confederate States Commissioner, London, England. 
[Enclosures.] 
Her Majesty’s Consulate, 
Galveston, October 3, 1863. 
     General: I herewith transmit for your consideration a copy of a letter which 
was yesterday placed in my hands by Mr. Watson, the owner of the Rob Roy, a 
British vessel, which has lately entered the port of Velasco… 
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     …I have also to direct your attention to the condition in which the crew of Rob 
Roy are now placed. From the treatment to which British seamen, who have found 
themselves in this state, have hitherto been exposed, I must infer that but slight 
regard will be paid to their rights as neutrals…I now learn that they have been 
forcibly impressed on board the gunboats at Shreveport…I consider it proper to 
state to you that it has been my duty to report to her Majesty’s Government that 
my remonstrances have been fruitless to effect a due observance of the rights of 
British subjects in this State. 
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,  
Arthur T. Lynn, 
Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul. 
Major-General J. B. Magruder,  
Commanding District of Texas, etc. 
Hdqrs. District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, 
Houston, Tex., October 21, 1863. 
…The schooner Rob Roy was released as soon as she was ascertained to be a 
British vessel. She was seized as a military necessity, to aid in constructing 
defenses at the mouth of the Brazos, in which river she was then lying. Some 
damage he is informed, may have been done her bulwarks in preparing her for the 
service. Colonel Bates, the officer making the impressment, has been directed to 
send these headquarters for payment any just account which may be incurred by 
the captain for such repairs as may be necessary to replace her in precisely the 
same condition as she was in before the seizure and which may be presented by 
the captain… 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Stephen D. Yancey,  
Assistant Adjutant-General. 
Arthur T. Lynn, Esq., 
Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Galveston, Tex. (Stewart 1987:842-845). 
 
 In the short time Watson was gone, the schooner completed its role as Confederate vessel 
and was towed up to shore, apparently meeting with an accident along the way. The rails were 
cut on both starboard and port to allow the pile driver to rest on the deck. While traveling up the 
river, another vessel collided with Rob Roy causing the pile driver to pull the railing away up to 
the stern, damaging the stanchions (Watson 2001:59). The Brigadier-General stationed in 
Houston gave permission to the locals to provide the sturdy oak needed to replace the railings. It 
was only because of Watson’s service in the Confederate army and connections with some of the 
local officials that permission to attain the oak was granted. 
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 Once again, when Watson returned to repair the schooner, Rob Roy met with another 
unfortunate fate, sinking in the harbor with only the top rails showing. Fortunately, the vessel 
had no iron ballast weighing it down, which would make raising it much easier. Though the new 
captain promised he did what he could to save the vessel and even removed the sails, he took it 
upon himself to get the schooner surveyed and find its worth. This captain was quickly asked to 
leave the service of Rob Roy, while Watson and some captains of fellow schooners found a way 
to raise the vessel from the depths. With the additional investment of Martin and Co. Watson was 
able to afford the costly raising and pay Captain S (another schooner’s captain) to provide the 
labor and tools needed. In late November, strong north winds were blowing, which lowered the 
river allowing for a smoother extraction of the vessel from the depths. Within two days, Rob Roy 
was raised, creating a second lease on life as a blockade runner. The cause of the sinking was 
discovered by the third day when all the cargo was removed. One of the screw jacks from the 
cotton bundles had pushed into the hull, causing a seam in the centerboard casing to open, but 
the cotton soaked up the water keeping the vessel afloat longer. To repair the hull, a deck beam 
was pounded on with a heavy weight until the board was put back into place and the seam was 
caulked up (Watson 2001:80).  
 Rob Roy was thoroughly cleaned, dried, and refitted with fresh mattresses and bedding, 
all very expensive, but made possible by the new owners Mathews and Co. The vessel remained 
under the control of Watson even though it was under new ownership. Rob Roy was being 
returned to a functioning state; federal forces managed to attack the nearby forts, causing a need 
for the service of schooners sitting in port. As Mathews and Co were unable to provide a cargo 
load for some time, Rob Roy returned to the Confederate service. Rob Roy carried timber and 
other provisions from Columbia to Fort Velasco during its service with the Confederacy (Watson 
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2001:83). Though the vessel was shot at by Union steamers, it was able to finish its duties for the 
Confederate forces unscathed. Near the end of 1863, the Union Navy continued to struggle with 
around the clock blockading of the Brazos, which led to a steady flow of blockade runners even 
until the end of the war (Hall 2014:38). 
 After traveling up and down the Brazos River for so long, the vessel became fouled by 
barnacles. The ship was careened along the sandbanks where the tides would not come in for 24 
hours, providing enough time to clean and coat the hull with a tallow mixture. Torches were used 
to kill the roots of the barnacles attached to the hull. The mixture was prepared by heating two 
pounds of white lead into three pounds of tallow to 150 degrees Fahrenheit. After the mixture 
was applied, the vessel was left to dry and turned to repeat the process (Watson 2001:86). Once 
cleaned, Rob Roy sailed lighter and smoother, making its way to a local sugar plantation for 
cargo. Nearby, another schooner Exchange would be captured by Union blockader USS Antona 
off Velasco, Texas, as it headed into port (Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:335). The Acting 
Master reported to Welles, Secretary of the Navy: 
Report of Acting Master Zerega, US Navy, Commanding USS Antona, regarding 
the capture of the British Schooner Exchange. 
USS Antona, 
Off Galveston, December 25, 1863. 
  Sir: I have the honor to report that on the 24th instant, on my way from Pass 
Cavallo to this place, I captured the British schooner Exchange for attempting to 
violate the blockade. At the time of capture we were in 8 fathoms of water, 
Velasco bearing west, true, distant 10 miles. The schooner was first seen at 8:30 
pm bearing E by N, distant 5 miles, and steering about W by N…Exchange, from 
Nassau, bound for New Orleans…Her cargo consists of coffee, nails, tin plates, 
cotton goods, acids, iron wire, gunny cloth, cotton baling, rope, cases of boots and 
shoes, cases, contents unknown, and a quantity of liquors… 
…I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Alfred L.B. Zerega, 
Acting Master, Commanding USS Antona. 
Hon. Gideon Welles, 




 The next day Rob Roy’s crew traveled another 22 miles to a nearby plantation where 
Christmas celebrations were held. While the crew celebrated, Rob Roy waited to load its new 
cargo of cotton, sugar, poultry, venison hams, and a cask of wine from the plantation. Following 
the holiday, Rob Roy was reevaluated after the repairs and loss of cargo. Martin and Co paid all 
the accounts of the vessel and fixed the worth of cotton to 14 cents per pound at any neutral port 
(Table 4.4). This new arrangement meant that William Watson was one-eighth the owner when 
only six months prior, he was the full owner (Watson 2001:94). Before Rob Roy could return to 
sea, it needed permission to leave the port, which Watson attained by General Magruder. 
Meanwhile, the ship took on a new crew and towed another schooner out of danger from the 
Union blockade. General Magruder granted Rob Roy permission to exit the port and employed 
the vessel to carry a packet of papers to Havana. In February that same year, Rob Roy made its 
way back into the Gulf loaded with important legal documents as cargo (Watson 2001:106).  
TABLE 4.4 COTTON: BLOCKADE MARGIN IN TEXAS, 1864  
(Lebergott 1981:864) 
Item Price Cost 
1. Market price in CSA (Houston, Galveston)  $0.06 
2. Value of export permit $0.05  
3. Transport: interior to Rio Grande $0.03  
4. CSA export duty $0.00125  
5. Mexican import duty $0.034  
6. Smuggling cost $0.128  
7. Market price in Tampico, Mexico  $0.303 
8. Mexican export duty $0.038  
9. Market price in Havana  $0.343 
10. Reshipping cotton in Havana $0.01  
11. Transport to Liverpool $0.20  
12. Market price in UK  $0.55 
13. Market price in NYC (Gold)  $0.558 
 
As Rob Roy ventured back into the Gulf from Columbia, Texas bound for Tampico, it 
was joined by two other schooners, Mary Elizabeth and Hind. Hind fell behind and was most 
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likely captured while Mary Elizabeth and Rob Roy were able to continue. Both got caught in a 
storm bringing a gale that cracked the strop, which held the topmast staysail in place. Once the 
storm passed, Rob Roy lost sight of Mary Elizabeth and did not come in contact until the 
following morning where they found Hind captured by Union forces. The same Union forces 
attempted to capture them, but the weather favored Rob Roy, allowing it to escape; the fate of 
Mary Elizabeth remained unknown until later. 
 Sometime within the month of February 1864, Rob Roy reached longitude 97 
approximately 40 miles east of Tampico. Within hours the vessel dropped anchor at the port of 
Tampico. During its voyage from Columbia on the Brazos River to Tampico, Rob Roy appeared 
to be leaking. It was soon discovered that not having the cotton packed tightly caused the ship to 
sail less smoothly, allowing water to wash over the sides. While in port, part of the cargo was 
consigned to Gomez, a party designated by Mathews and Co, and the vessel was entered at the 
custom house. With the French in control of Tampico, import and export prices were reduced, 
and the freight due was only $13,500 while the cargo was valued at $30,000 (Watson 2001:126).  
After these investors took a share of the profits, Rob Roy sat and waited for departure as 
paperwork took longer in Mexico. By this point in the war, these exchanges in Mexico were 
complicated by the presence of French troops and internal disputes (Underwood 2003:108). 
 Rob Roy departed Tampico March 1864 in the direction of Havana with the same 21 
bales of cotton and water casks serving as ballast because it was difficult to obtain ballast at the 
time (Watson 2001:137). The crossing from Tampico to Havana was uneventful, and the 
schooner was able to reach Havana by mid-March. Rob Roy was one of the many blockade 
runners flocking to Havana for its economically beneficial role during the Civil War. Here new 
cargo was acquired, cotton was sold, and William Watson settled debts with the vessels’ 
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investors Martin and Co (Watson 2001:140). Rob Roy was valued at $4,000, but after all the 
debts were paid, Watson was still only half owner with Brown, who took no active part with the 
vessel while in port. Watson was left with a profit of $2,000 after all debts were settled and cargo 
was sold (Watson 2001:141).  
 Watson searched for a new cargo while Rob Roy was sent to the shipyard for cleaning 
and general repairs. Mr. R. Martin found him and offered to consign on a profitable cargo whose 
destination was Texas along the blockaded ports. With this exchange, Rob Roy became a courier 
of 200 Enfield rifles with bayonets, 400 cavalry swords, 400 Belgium muskets with bayonets, six 
cases of saddlery, 25 boxes of ammunition, and other goods needed by the Confederate forces. 
Rob Roy was again employed as a courier for important dispatches to return to General Magruder 
(Watson 2001:149). The Enfield rifles alone brought in a 50-60% profit when sold to the 
Confederacy or other buyers in Matamoros (Irby 1973:17).  
It was now April 1864, and Rob Roy began another journey, this time to Galveston. Rob 
Roy was legally cleared for Belize, Honduras, and ventured out from Havana towards Galveston, 
its true destination, along with Captain Dave commander of another unidentified blockade 
runner. Within the first night, Rob Roy lost sight of Captain Dave’s vessel, and for the first few 
weeks, the vessel crept along with low sails to avoid capture. About 120 miles from Galveston, 
the crew aboard Rob Roy met with a possibly dangerous event. They passed and were ignored by 
a Union steamer and then narrowly escaped Sylvia, a blockade runner that had been captured as a 
prize ship and used as bait for further captures.  
On April 19, 1864, another schooner like Rob Roy was captured by USS Owasco off 
Velasco, Texas. This vessel, Fanny, was a small sailing schooner captained by a Robert B. 
Wilson of Dublin. Fanny provides an example of blockade runners captured with full cargo and 
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auctioned as prize ships. Aboard Fanny was a cargo worth $2,222, including a case of Enfield 
Rifles, smooth bore muskets, and sabers, which were categorized as “Munitions of War” 
(Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:109). This vessel was structurally able to maneuver in the 
Gulf of Mexico and survived less than a month as a blockade runner (Powell, Cordon, and 
Arnold 2012:251). 
In June 1864, Rob Roy docked safely in Galveston Bay and delivered the cargo to the 
Confederate forces and documents to General Magruder. For two months, the vessel was idle 
while Watson and Brown discussed the next voyage. While waiting, the schooner was careened, 
cleaned, and repaired. In 1864 the blockade tightened along several Southern ports, many of 
which were sealed. In August, Mobile Bay was lost to the Union, and more blockade running 
shifted in the Gulf of Mexico to the Texas ports (Roberts 2004:119). 
 In August of 1864, Rob Roy was finally loaded with a cargo of cotton, half of which 
belonged to Martin and Co (Watson 2001:190), and sweet potatoes, poultry acquired from a 
nearby farm, and barrels of oysters gathered from the shoals the night before. Unfortunately, the 
vessel could not depart from Galveston until September because a crew member fell ill with 
yellow fever. Galveston had just suffered a harsh winter followed by food shortages and an 
outbreak of disease like yellow fever (Cotham 1998:162). While waiting Rob Roy narrowly 
escaped another Confederate impressment and by September was finally given clearance to leave 
Galveston. Before heading to sea, the captain dragged the base of the hull over low, soft, and 
shelly sandbars to clean the barnacle growth (Watson 2001:199). 
  On 12 September, the vessel was finally cleared and ready to run the blockade just 
outside of Galveston. Rob Roy and Mary Elizabeth exited the bay around the same time, but by 
the time Rob Roy cleared the blockade, they lost sight of their fellow blockade runner. It was not 
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until very early the following morning that any other vessel was spotted. The crew identified this 
vessel as a Union blockader John Anderson which chased them once before. As they 
maneuvered away, avoiding capture again, they set eyes on Mary Elizabeth. Soon the blockader 
would be the least of their worries as a storm washed through, causing them to lose sight of each 
other yet again, as well as causing damage to Rob Roy’s boom.  
 The following day Rob Roy made it to Tampico, where other small schooners were 
docked, but Mary Elizabeth was nowhere in sight and, according to Watson, never documented 
again. The storm that trapped the two schooners at sea was one of the heaviest recorded (Watson 
2001:215). This storm was one of four tropical cyclones documented during the hurricane season 
of 1864 and reportedly affected the travel of several vessels along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts 
(Fernandez-Partagas and Diaz 1995:54-55). Unfortunately, as the vessels waited to be pulled into 
shore, another storm began forming off the coast of Tampico. With careful movements and all 
crew on deck, Watson was able to maneuver Rob Roy through the shallow channels without the 
aid of a pilot avoiding destruction (Watson 2001:219). 
 After the cotton that needed to be unloaded in Tampico was landed, Watson was visited 
by representative Franks (Table 4.5), and the consignee Gomez (Table 4.6) who took half of the 
cotton. Having unloaded the cargo, Rob Roy was ready to complete the journey to Havana. 
Watson attempted to gather more supplies, but with the French presence in Tampico, there was 
not much in store. He was able to pick up an additional passenger as well as some barrels 
containing fine beef and pork. With business completed and new cargo, including Watson’s half 





TABLE 4.5 REPRESENTATIVE TABLE INCLUDING ASSOCIATION 
Representative Association Pseudonym Located 
Mr. F R. and D.G.M and 
Co. 
Franks  
Mr. P Brown Patrick Matamoros/Houston 
Mr. M Mathews and Co. Michael Houston 
Mr. R R. and D.G.M. and 
Co. 
Robert Galveston 
Mr. J.M. Mr. R. M. John Marks Galveston 
 
TABLE 4.6 CONSIGNEE TABLE INCLUDING OWNERSHIP OF CARGO 
Consignee Pseudonym Located Percentage 
Owned 
Sum Ship or 
Cargo 
Messrs. G Gomez Tampico, 
Mexico 
50% Unknown Cargo 
Mr. R.M. Mr. R. 
Martin 
Havana 50% Unknown Cargo 
Messrs. A. Alvarez Havana Unknown Unknown Cargo 
Mr. C. Collins Galveston 50% Unknown Cargo 
  
When Rob Roy arrived in Havana, it was busy with trade as always, but now the 
consulate moved, which changed the flow of business. Watson attempted to dissolve his 
partnership with a member of Mr. R. Martin, a member of Martin and Co. but instead cosigned 
on a new cargo deal. After the vessel was logged and discharged, the new cargo of potato seed 
for the farmers in Texas were placed on the ship. This cargo load included additional goods 
needed by Texas citizens, destined for Galveston. As things took longer to process in Havana, 
Rob Roy underwent needed maintenance until the vessel was cleared for Galveston (Watson 
2001:237). 
 In early December 1864, with a new foresail, Rob Roy was ready to sail for Galveston. 
As the vessel departed, they were under close eye of two Union steamships, neither of them 
followed (Watson 2001:249). According to Union reports, several blockading vessels were 
placed in the region when Rob Roy traveled to Havana, including Nita, Stars and Stripes, and 
Hendrick Hudson (Stewart 1903:778-780). Rob Roy cleared the steamships; the vessel was 
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chased by another steamship while caught in bad weather. The storm blew Rob Roy off course 
for a while, and the crew was forced to lay anchor. As the storm finally passed, Rob Roy was in 
six feet of water, closer to the port than expected. With some assistance of four oarsmen on 
board, the boat was pulled over the sandbar and passed the blockading force (Watson 2001:257). 
 As soon as the vessel made port in Galveston and unloaded the cargo, Watson went about 
finding the parts to replace the main boom that was damaged during the storm. He tried to use 
his connections with General Magruder, but the general was not in Galveston. When Watson 
described his predicament to Commodore Smith of the Marine Department, he was able to find 
the parts and services necessary (Watson 2001:259). In fact, the main mast was replaced with 
one of the spars from Harriet Lane (Figure 4.5). Harriet Lane was a successful war vessel that 
began service in 1857 as an African-slaver and rum-runner but had been captured by the 
Confederates at the battle of Galveston New Year’s Day, 1863. Harriet Lane was a two-masted 
side-wheeled steamer (Trexler 1931:109) almost twice the size of Rob Roy and was dismantled 
and stored in one of the Transport Sheds in Galveston. After its capture, Harriet Lane served as a 
blockade runner for the Confederacy under the name Lavinia (Hall 2014:51). As repairs were 
completed, Watson found more cargo for Rob Roy to transport to Vera Cruz or Tampico, 




FIGURE 4.5. United States Steamer Harriet Lane (Lavinia) (Underwood 2003:88). 
 The time was now January 1865, and Rob Roy headed to Vera Cruz with a cargo load of 
54 pressed cotton bales. The vessel made its way through the channel and was fired at by a 
nearby gunboat. The larger vessel approached Rob Roy, stopped firing, and attempted to come 
alongside. Luckily, Rob Roy was drawing about four feet of water, and it was too shallow for the 
larger gunboat. Soon after the Union sailors placed a boat hook on Rob Roy pulling it towards 
them, the wind picked up, and acting quickly, Watson cut the rope and escaped. At first, the men 
in the gunboat shot at the schooner, but the wind was on their side, and none of the shots reached 
Rob Roy. The weather remained in favor of Rob Roy and was able to quickly outrun the Union 
forces continuing their way to Vera Cruz (Watson 2001:275). 
 By February 1865, the danger of blockade running was increasing, and merchants were 
getting desperate to sell their goods quickly. The Union also received wind of the trade occurring 
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along the Mexican coast and were frequenting the area more. Running the blockade into 
Galveston and Mexican or Cuban ports increased as late as the spring of 1865 (Cotham 
1998:168). Other successful blockade runners, including Will-o’-the-Wisp and Banshee II that 
had spent their time on the Atlantic coast, began traveling to the Gulf of Mexico. Steamers such 
as Denbigh, which had successfully run the blockade into Mobile since late 1863, began running 
into Galveston as it was one of the only remaining ports of entry (Arnold 2011:15).  
At Vera Cruz, forty-five of the bales of cotton aboard Rob Roy were sold, and 28 were 
reshipped under new bills of lading for the return trip to Havana (Watson 2001:279). Watson 
made sure to leave Vera Cruz quickly and made the trip to Havana in only eight days without 
bad weather or Union cruisers in sight. Upon his arrival at Havana, Watson found that his 
previous exchange with investors had been disputed. Mr. R. Martin convinced the Provost 
Marshal’s Department to hold Rob Roy until the business dispute could be agreed upon by all 
parties (Watson 2001:283). Unfortunately for Watson and Rob Roy, the proceedings were not in 
favor of Watson’s ownership, and so Rob Roy was auctioned to the highest bidder. Watson 
placed a $3,500 bid but lost to an unknown British gentleman who bid $3,600. It was on this day, 
18 February 1865, that Rob Roy’s fate was changed. Within only days of new ownership, Rob 
Roy was run aground and burned as reported to Watson from one of his past crew members. 
Reports suggest that the final journey as a blockade runner was from Havana to Florida with 
(according to the reports Watson received) an abundance of cotton onboard. Before Rob Roy 
could reach its destination along the Suwannee River (Figure 4.6), it was spotted by a Union 
gunboat, Fox, and purposefully run aground and burned by the crew to avoid capture (Watson 
2001:286). Though William Watson no longer owned Rob Roy, he continued to serve as a 
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blockade runner and ran one last successful campaign into Galveston Bay. On 1 March 1865, he 
served on board the 445-ton single-screw steamer Pelican (Underwood 2003:58). 
 
FIGURE 4.6. Map of Northwest Florida (Wise 1988:38). 
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Lieutenant John Sherrill of USS Stars and Stripes reported to Gideon Welles the acting secretary 
of the Navy that the schooner Fox, tender to the USS Stars and Stripes, located and captured the 
crew and partial cargo of Rob Roy along the south side of Deadman’s Bay on March 12, 1865 
(Stewart 1903:825): 
Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Sherrill, U.S. Navy, commanding USS 
Stars and Stripes, regarding the running ashore and firing of the schooner Rob 
Roy by her won crew. 
USS Stars and Stripes, 
St. Marks River, March 12, 1865. 
Sir: I have the honor to report that the schooner Fox (a tender to this vessel), 
while lying at anchor at Deadman’s Bay on the 2d instant, discovered a strange 
schooner at anchor on the south side of the bay near the shore. An armed boat was 
sent to attempt her capture, from which she endeavored to escape; but unable to 
effect this, was run ashore and fired by her crew. The flames spread with such 
rapidity and had obtained such a control by the time the boat’s crew got alongside 
that it was found impossible to extinguish them. She proved to be the Rob Roy, of 
Belize, Honduras. A small portion of the cargo was saved in a damaged condition. 
The saved portion consisted of a lot of cavalry sabers and farming and mechanical 
implements. The Rob Roy was of about 60 tons burden. 
The articles saved will be sent to the prize court at key West for 
adjudication. I enclose herewith a complete list of the officers and crew entitled to 
share in the above capture. 
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
John Sherrill, 
Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding. 
Hon. Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy. 
  
Discussion 
Historians emphasize certain elements that make a blockade runner successful, including; vessel 
type, distance traveled (Figure 4.7), runs without capture, the lifespan of a vessel while blockade 
running, and net profit of the investment. As a blockade runner Rob Roy had several successful 
runs in the Gulf of Mexico during its almost two years of service. Rob Roy was but one of many 
successful blockade runners; of those serving in the Gulf of Mexico along the Texas coast under 
sail, it is referred to as one of the most successful. Other well-known blockade runners of the 
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area include Denbigh, Will-o’-the-Wisp, and Banshee II, all of which were steamers, some of 
which were designed purely for the act of blockade running.  Denbigh (Figure 4.8) spent most of 
its career running the blockade to Mobile and following the fall, to Galveston. Denbigh was built 
by Laird, Sons & Co., Birkenhead, and registered in Liverpool, London. The side-wheel steamer 
was first launched in August 1860 and measured 182 feet in length with a 22-foot beam and a 
hold depth of 8.7 feet. It was able to reach a speed of 13.7 knots and, as a blockade runner, made 
13 successful round trips between 1863 and 1865 (Table 4.7) (Arnold 2011:14).  
 




FIGURE 4.8. Computer rendered portrait of Denbigh created by Andrew W. Hall (Powell, 
Cordon, and Arnold 2012:12). 
TABLE 4.7 STEP BY STEP JOURNEY OF DENBIGH  
(Arnold, Oertling, Hall 2001:5-6) 
Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Denbigh 
December 1863 Nassau to Havana Introduced to Denbigh 
January 1863-January 1864 Havana to Mobile A year passes without 
documentation 
Feb/March 1864- April 1864 Mobile to Havana First run as blockade runner 
and makes two round trips 
back to Mobile 
April 1864 – June 1864 Mobile to Havana Acquired a new master and 
makes four round trips to 
Mobile 
July 1864 Mobile to Havana Last vessel out before the 
capture of Mobile Bay 
August 1864 Havana to Galveston  
September 1864 Galveston to Havana  
September 1864 Havana to Galveston  
September/October 1864 – 
April 1865 
Galveston to Havana Acquired a new master and 
makes five round trips to 
Galveston 
May 1865 Havana to Galveston  





Denbigh ran the Gulf Coast blockade successfully under the command of three separate 
captains and during its time as a blockade runner transported cotton and other cargo to three 
different ports (Table 4.8). As a blockade runner on the eastern side of the Gulf of Mexico, it ran 
a rather successful campaign, and thanks to the extensive research of Barto Arnold, there is 
countless documentation to show the overall success and economic impact the vessel held for its 
investors and the Confederacy. Denbigh successfully ran the blockade along the Texas coast on 
seven separate occasions, but due to its size, it was unable to maneuver the smaller inland ports. 
As a blockade runner of the Gulf of Mexico, Denbigh is one of the most successful. Two other 
successful blockade runners of the Gulf of Mexico include Will-o’-the-Wisp and Banshee II; 
both were manufactured for the purpose of running the Civil War blockade. 
TABLE 4.8 THE DENBIGH’S COTTON CARGO FOR THE MOVILE TO HAVANA LEG  
(Arnold 2011:22) 
Voyage 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Date 1864 16 Jan 16 Mar 16 Apr 4 May 26 May  14 June 


































# Bails 500 424 476 445 442 421 
Weight in Lbs. 249,658 201,600 212,760 210,992 224,544 218,890 
Value in $^8  $124,729 $151,111 $153,365 $105,496 $112,272 $124,764 
Export Duty @ 311.82 252.00 266.00 263.74 280.68 223.68 
Local Market 
Value per Lb. 
50 cents 75 cents 72 cents 50 cents 50 cents 57 cents 
Purchaser price 
$ @ 6 penc/lb. 
(12cents/lb.) 








Banshee II (Figure 4.9), designed after Banshee I, a successful blockade runner of the 
East Coast, measured 252 feet long with a beam of 31 feet, a depth of 11 feet, and had a 
registered tonnage of 439 (Cochran 1958:87). The steel-hulled paddle steamer represented a 
successful Clyde built steamer that was originally designed to maneuver along the coastline of 
the United Kingdom and across the Irish Sea (Hall 2014:66). The design suited blockade running 
for shallow inland waterways and long-distance travel across the treacherous Atlantic. Banshee 
II was captained by the experienced blockade runner Thomas Taylor who invested in 
constructing vessels to run the blockade and successfully captained the original Banshee I (Table 
4.9). Banshee II was launched at Glasgow in 1864, constructed for the Anglo Confederate 
Trading Company, and in March 1865 ran the blockade from Havana to Galveston (Hall 
2014:66; Underwood 2003:57). The vessel was able to bring in a profit from its trip into Texas, 
but it never ran the blockade into Galveston again (Table 4.10) (Taylor 48).  
 




TABLE 4.9.  BLOCKADE RUNNER PROFITS: STEAMER BANSHEE I 
 (Lebergott 1981:871) 
Item Values 
1. Investment in vessel $168,000 
2. Gross earnings: Inward $130,000 
3.                           Outward $120,000 
                                       Total $250,000 
4. Expenses: Pilot and Crew $23,000 
5.                  Refitting $2,000 
6.                  Coal $3,600 
                             Total $28,000 
7. Net Return: $221,400 
8. Rate of Return on Successful Round Trip 132 percent 
 
TABLE 4.10 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF BANSHEE II 
(Wise 1988) 
Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Banshee II 
October 1864 Bermuda to Wilmington Introduced to Banshee II 
October 1864 Wilmington to Nassau Thomas Taylor takes over as 
captain 
November 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
November 1864 Wilmington to Nassau  
December 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
December 1864 Wilmington to Nassau  
March 1865 Havana to Galveston Thomas Taylors first and last 
run into the Texas port. 
March 1865 Galveston to Havana  
April 1865 Havana to Liverpool  
 
Will-o’-the-Wisp (Figure 4.10) was constructed by the same company as Banshee II for 
the sole purpose of running the blockade and lived a short yet profitable career. Will-o’-the-Wisp 
was a steel-hulled Clyde built steamer measuring 209.5 feet long by 23.2 feet wide with a length-
to-beam ratio of nine to one (Hall 2014:66). This type of steamer had a long hull and shallow 
draft, making it well adapted for running and even protecting blockaded ports. The vessel was 
launched in 1863 from Renfrew, leaking through its maiden voyage to Nassau. Taylor took 
command of Will-o’-the-Wisp after its maiden voyage successfully running the blockade into 
Wilmington even though the vessel continued to leak (Cochran 1958:90). Taylor eventually sold 
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the vessel to a new buyer, which proved to be detrimental to the life of the vessel. In December 
1864, under the command of Abner M. Godfrey, Will-o’-the-Wisp ran the blockade into 
Galveston. The vessel successfully entered the port, but as it attempted to exit the blockade 
destined for Havana in early February 1865, it was shot and eventually ran aground several miles 
south of Galveston Island (Table 4.11) (Hall 2014:68,86-87). 
 
FIGURE 4.10. Digital Reconstruction of the Blockade Runner Will-o’-the-Wisp (Hall 2014:67). 
TALBE 4.11 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF WILL-O’-THE-WISP 
(Wise 1988) 
Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Will-o’-the-Wisp 
November 1863 Renfrew to Nassau Maiden voyage of vessel 
April 1864 Nassau to Wilmington Crashed on a sandbar on way 
into Cape Fear River 
April 1864 Wilmington to Nassau Upon arrival to Nassau vessel 
sunk and was raised by 
Taylor 
May 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
May 1864 Wilmington to Nassau  
May 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
June 1864 Wilmington to Nassau  
June 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
July 1864 Wilmington to Nassau  
September 1864 Nassau to Wilmington  
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Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Will-o’-the-Wisp 
18 September 1864 Nassau Vessel is sold to a new 
company and taken under a 
new commander. 
December 1864 To Galveston Under command of Abner M. 
Godfrey 
9 February 1865 Exiting Galveston Run aground near Galveston 
Island 
 
Rob Roy may not have shared structural similarities with the previous vessels, but as a 
blockade runner in the same region frequented by Denbigh, Will-o’-the-Wisp, and Banshee II, it 
was able to hold its own and prove itself successful as a West Gulf Coast Blockade runner. The 
importance this vessel held in the Gulf of Mexico during the Civil War, the economic success of 
the vessel, and what role its construction played in its success, will be discussed with the 
assistance of the following charts. The first table (Table 4.10) provides simplified documentation 
of the various journeys taken by Rob Roy. The second table (Table 4.11) provides a clarified 
description of the various cargo the vessel transported while in service. The third table (Table 
4.12) provides the estimated profit of Rob Roy created by Lebergott (1981) in his economic study 
on the profitability of cotton smuggling during the Civil War. The fourth table (Table 4.13) 
provides a comparison of the vessels discussed in this section, including the five categories that 
makes a blockade runner historically successful. The final chart (Figure 4.11) provides a brief 
history of Rob Roy from its start as a blockade runner to its final destination in Deadman’s Bay. 
TABLE 4.12 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF ROB ROY 
Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Rob Roy 
June 1863 New Orleans to Belize Introductions to the 
vessel.Transports passengers 
and unknown cargo. 
July/August 1863 Belize to Matamoros Gathers investors and 
supplies. 




Month/Year Origin and Destination Notes on Rob Roy 
January 1864 Columbia to Tampico Narrowly escapes the Union 
blockade and impressment by 
the Confederate Navy. 
March 1864 Tampico to Havana Delivers cotton and federal 
papers from General 
Magruder. 
April 1864 Havana to Galveston Delivers supplies for 
Confederate forces. 
September 1864 Galveston to Tampico Delivers cotton, but half 
remains onboard. 
October/November 1864 Tampico to Havana Delivers cotton 
December 1864 Havana to Galveston Transports cotton and potato 
seed. 
January 1865 Galveston to Vera Cruz Transports cotton and 
narrowly escapes Union 
capture. 
February 1865 Vera Cruz to Havana Delivers cotton to Havana. 
18 February 1865 Havana Auctioned and under new 
ownership. 
March 1865 Havana to Florida Transports cotton. 
2 March 1865 Deadman’s Bay, Florida The vessel is run aground and 
burned, avoiding Union 
forces. 
 
TABLE 4.13 CARGO CARRIED BY ROB ROY 
Destination Cargo Worth 
Columbia, Texas Unknown Unknown 
Tampico, Mexico Cotton, Confederate 
documents 
30,000 dollars 
Havana, Cuba 21 bales of cotton, 
Confederate documents 
13,500 dollars 
Galveston, Texas 200 Enfield Rifles, 400 
Belgium Muskets, 400 
Cavalry Swords, Six Cases of 
Saddlery, Blankets, Clothing, 
Hardware, Tea, Coffee, 
Cheese, Spices, Liquors, 
Needle and Thread, 
Confederate dispatches 
Unknown 
Tampico, Mexico 198 Bales of Cotton 6000 dollars 
Havana, Cuba 25 Bales of Cotton, Barrels of 
Salt Beef & Pork,  
500-1000 dollars 
Galveston, Texas 25 Tons of Bar Iron, 




Destination Cargo Worth 
Earthenware, Stationary, Tea, 
Coffee, 40 Barrels of Potato 
Seed, 30 Bales of Army 
Blankets and Tent Cloth, Gun 
Powder, Other Groceries 
Vera Cruz, Mexico 124 Bales of Cotton 3000-4000 dollars 
Havana, Cuba 146 Bales of Cotton 3000-4000 dollars 
Suwannee, Florida Cotton Unknown 
 
TABLE 4.14 BLOCKADE RUNNER PROFITS: SCHOONER ROB ROY 
(Lebergott 1981:870) 
Item Value 
1. Investment in vessel $5000 
2. Net return on vessel, Brownsville – Havana $5804 
3. Rate of return on successful: outward voyage 116 percent 
 
TABLE 4.15 COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS OF GULF COAST 
BLOCKADE RUNNERS 
Category Rob Roy Denbigh Banshee II Will-o’-the-Wisp 
Vessel Type (Year Began 





















12/13 26/27 8/8 12/15 
Lifetime as Blockade 
Runner 
21 months 16 months 9 months 13 months 
Net Profit (Approximate) 120% 500% Unknown Unknown 
Distance Traveled 
(Approximate) 





FIGURE 4.11. Historical account of Rob Roy. 
 The success of Rob Roy as an agent of change was directly correlated with controlled and 
uncontrolled variables. The crew and weather often varied, while the hull of the vessel remained 
relatively unchanged, with structural modifications as necessary. The flat-bottomed centerboard 
design of Rob Roy afforded it opportunities that other blockade running vessels and often the 
Union blockaders were incapable of doing. In fact, it is because of its design that the schooner 
was suited to the shallow inland waterways and rough waters along the gulf shelf. Areas like the 
Yucatan Peninsula, Galveston Bay, Rio Grande, and west Florida coast were only maneuverable 
by shallow-droughted vessels like the centerboard schooner. Its smaller size and sailing abilities 
kept it from capture and allowed it to be rowed if necessary. As a carrier of goods, Rob Roy held 
a shallow draught when fully loaded without capsizing in turbulent waters. The vessel was 
seaworthy and still managed to function in the shallow bays and riverways in blockaded regions. 
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The overall success of William Watson, other investors, and crew can be directly credited to Rob 
Roy’s abilities as a blockade runner and William Watson as a captain. A vessel’s success in 
blockade running was linked to the construction as well as the skill of the individual 
maneuvering the vessel. For example, Will-o’-the-Wisp was successful under the command of 
Taylor, but after a new individual captained it, it was quickly run aground. Rob Roy was 
successful under the command of Watson, but once it was sold, it was run aground and burned. 
 The cargo carried by Rob Roy added to the overall economic success of the Confederacy, 
investors in Civil War trade, the livelihood of the vessel’s crew and captain, as well as overall 
well-being to those who used the cargo. The cotton was, of course, considered the true source of 
revenue of the Confederacy and, therefore, the funding force during the war. Other items, such as 
the munitions and supplies transported from Havana to Galveston, directly influenced the 
economic success of the Confederate forces along the coast of Texas. Specialty items such as 
cheese, coffee, and even alcohol were difficult for many to come by, so when Rob Roy was able 
to transport them into ports, these items were considered a luxury and would often be received 
with much gratitude. 
 This discussion about Rob Roy during its use as a blockade runner can explain only a 
short period of time in the life of the vessel. Without further investigation and eventual 
identification of the physical remains of Rob Roy, there can only be a historical understanding of 
the interactions held prior to this vessel becoming a blockade runner and after its untimely loss 
near Florida. The following section will discuss the archaeological survey of the area where Rob 





Rob Roy was a successful blockade runner of the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil 
War. The vessel served 21 months and contributed to the lives of investors and crew members. 
Accounts of the vessel’s final journey vary, but it is historically recorded that the vessel was run 
aground and burned within Deadman’s Bay. According to magnetometer recordings of 
Steinhatchee River and the historical record of the area, there was a possible association with 
Rob Roy, and the wreckage found there. After the investigation, the wreckage was clearly 
identified as a boiler, ruling out the site as the resting place of Rob Roy. The “old boiler” 
identified in Steinhatchee shared qualities with boilers utilized during the Civil War and still may 
be associated with salt works along the coast of Florida. The artifact biography of Rob Roy, as 
well as that of the “old boiler,” will remain unfinished without further investigation. Upon the 
conclusion of the field work, the location can now be eliminated, opening other possibilities for 
further investigation. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
This chapter will apply the knowledge gained from the research of the blockade runner Rob Roy 
to the primary and secondary research questions. Finally, it will discuss questions raised from 
this thesis for future research and limitations faced during the research process. 
 
Answering the Primary Research Question 
• What contribution does the study of one blockade runner have on the general 
understanding of the interaction of ports in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil 
War?  
Though the historical account written by Watson was vague at times, it proved the vessel was 
an important player in the success of the confederacy as well as those involved in trade. This 
vessel is one of many involved in blockade running during the Civil War, but this vessel was 
unique because of the accounts presented by the captain. There is countless history written on the 
exchange of cotton between ports during the American Civil War, but this account adds to the 
overall understanding that those involved in the transport and trade of this contraband material 
were willing to take a risk for the economic gain as well as the adventure itself. The act of 
blockade running directly affected the success of ports as well as the chance that those ports 
would become targets for Union blockades and battles.  
A blockade runner such as Rob Roy provided monetary gain for those involved and an 
increase in trade between ports that were less frequented before the war. Key examples of these 
forts are Brownsville, Matamoros, and Baghdad, all of which grew exponentially after blockade 
running became common place. The Rio Grande and bordering cities profited after the outbreak 
of the Civil War because this borderland became one of the only roads for transporting 
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Confederate cotton overseas. Four separate nations sent their armies and navies to take control of 
the neutral zone, including Mexico, France, the Union, and Confederacy (Irby 1977:7). Cotton 
would be transported from Galveston to Brownsville, then be transferred to the small island of 
Baghdad, then be taken to Matamoros from where cotton and other goods would be shipped. Rob 
Roy was one of the few blockade runners that were able to interact with these three ports. The 
movements of Rob Roy were essential for discussing the social economic interactions when the 
vessel made port within the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial role Rob Roy played during the war 
could not be separated from the military importance of blockade running and justifies Gould’s 
(2011:269) interpretation of the social history of blockade-runners during the American Civil 
War. Gould (2011:280) suggests that there is a direct relationship between the success of a vessel 
that went to war during the Industrial Revolution and the sociocultural process of the time, 
including technology, labor, and risk. The study of Rob Roy provides evidence that the success of 
blockade runners included several factors such as distance traveled, time spent as a blockade 
runner, profit made by investors, and the type of vessel being used. After a thorough analysis of 
Rob Roy alongside other vessels considered successful within the same time and local, Rob Roy 
proved to be an important contributor to the overall success of blockade running during the 
American Civil War within the Gulf of Mexico especially within the smaller inlets less 
frequented by steamers and larger vessels.  
 
Answering the Secondary Research Questions 
In addition to the primary research question, this thesis sought to understand three secondary 
questions which were intended to provide a particularist perspective while completing the 
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primary research goal. This section will recall those questions, provide a brief summary, and 
reference the appropriate section for a clearer understanding.  
• What is the artifact biography of Rob Roy?  
The origins of the flat-bottomed centerboard schooner are unknown, but the history of 
Rob Roy as a Civil War blockade runner is clear. The vessel began its adventure in September of 
1863 after William Watson purchased it in New Orleans and had it refitted and renamed as Rob 
Roy in Belize, Honduras. It was not until Rob Roy’s first journey into Matamoros that it started 
working as a blockade runner under that name. On its first interaction with running the blockade 
into Sabine Pass, Rob Roy was struck on the starboard side, nearly missing a worse fate. After 
the hole was patched and the vessel rigged it was impressed into service for the Confederacy. 
While in service Rob Roy’s railings were damaged and repaired. While waiting for its next 
adventure, full of cotton, Rob Roy sank in the Sabine River near West Columbia. With the help 
of another vessel, Rob Roy was pulled from the murky river, dried, and repaired.  Following its 
rise from the river, Rob Roy assisted the Confederacy with barricading the river to withstand 
Union forces, and all that time in the river made the hull fowled. The vessel was turned on its 
side, cleaned, and re-tallowed. As Rob Roy traveled from Columbia to Tampico, it was caught in 
a storm, and the strop cracked. Upon arrival in Havana, following its stop in Tampico, the vessel 
underwent repairs. After a stop in Galveston, Rob Roy set out on a return trip to Tampico and 
was caught in another northerner causing damage to the boom of the ship. Some repairs were 
made in Havana, including replacement of the foresail, but it was not until a trip into Galveston 
that Rob Roy had its boom repaired. Once in Galveston, Rob Roy’s boom was replaced with the 
help of the Confederacy, who used the spars from the captured Harriet Lane. Unfortunately for 
Rob Roy and Watson, the final trip to Havana leads to the loss of Rob Roy. The vessel was 
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auctioned and taken under new ownership. Only days after Rob Roy safely avoided capture, it 
was run aground in Deadman’s Bay by its new captain and burned to prevent Union capture. 
Unfortunately, Rob Roy has not been located, but the historical, archaeological analysis of this 
vessel outlined within this thesis provides great promise for the possible identification of and 
archaeological investigation of potential shipwrecks. 
• What can the archaeological investigation of the proposed location of Rob Roy reveal 
about its final demise? 
According to the historical record of William Watson and Union records, Rob Roy was 
scuttled and burned. Previous investigations conducted by treasure hunters reported the resting 
place of the remains of Rob Roy within Deadman’s Bay. The archaeological investigation 
conducted for this thesis explored an area near the reported resting place, a location known to 
hold an “old boiler” thought to be associated with Rob Roy or another blockade runner Havana. 
The investigation of this site did not provide adequate information to name the remains 
associated or not associated with Rob Roy. The investigation provided data to support that the 
artifact shared qualities with Civil War era boilers. Upon preliminary investigation, the boiler 
was composed of wrought iron and was fastened with rivets. The internal components included 
characteristics shared with flue boilers. Due to the small size and other features, this boiler could 
have been used for several functions, including salt works or farm work. The boiler was not big 
enough to power a vessel and was not used on board Rob Roy for any known reason. Without 
further investigation of the proposed site, it will remain unclear if the boiler is associated with 
Rob Roy. The archaeological investigation of the proposed resting place of Rob Roy created more 





After completing this project, there are several questions that remain unanswered and new 
locations left to explore. The original questions posed for this project were answered to an 
extent, but they can still be expounded upon. To properly record the life cycle of the vessel Rob 
Roy and contribute further to the primary question, more archaeological research needs to be 
conducted. After completing the research for this thesis, the anomalies investigated within 
Steinhatchee River can be eliminated, but much of Deadman’s Bay remains unexplored. The 
results of this thesis and the knowledge of the nearby river pose new questions. What is the 
resting place of Rob Roy? What were the specific modifications of Rob Roy and how did they 
influence the success or failure of the vessel? What is the “old boiler”? 
 
Limitations 
While conducting research for this project, there were several factors that limited the 
accessibility of information. Though accessibility was an issue during the research phase of this 
project, it did not keep the author from answering the primary questions for this thesis. While 
completing archival and historical research, several factors limited access to information, 
including access to primary source materials. The most accurate source of information for 
understanding the life of Rob Roy is a private journal of the captain William Watson (2001); 
unfortunately for history, he was discreet when discussing individuals involved in the illegal 
aspects of blockade running during the Civil War. Because this journal is a contemporary 
account, he protected the identity of those involved, and there is currently no way of identifying 
the individuals. Access to historical documentation was also limited because of the government 
shutdown. During the research period of this project, the United States government went through 
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two government shutdowns in one year (Science News Staff 2018). The first occurred in January 
and the second in December during the visit to the archives.  
 
Conclusions 
This thesis demonstrated the importance one vessel’s historical archaeological investigation 
could play in the grander history of Civil War blockade runners. Even though the artifact 
biography was confined to the brief time Rob Roy worked as a blockade runner, its interpretation 
and the information found at the archaeological site researched in this thesis was paramount to 
understanding the overall social economic history of exchange during the American Civil War. 
The cotton referred to as the lifeline of the Confederacy and the interaction with blockade 
runners, crew, and economic investors have proven to be important in the overall history of the 
American Civil War. Not only did this vessel provide a means of transportation of goods, but 
also transportation of information and therefore history itself. 
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APPENDIX: AGENCY AND ARTIFACT BIOGRAPHY 
In maritime archaeology, studying a shipwreck as a single artifact can often be difficult. A 
shipwreck can be considered both a site comprised of artifacts, as well as an individual artifact. 
One useful approach to the dilemma of site versus artifact is the application of “artifact 
biography” (Gosden and Marshall 1999, Schiffer 1967). Artifact biography is an approach 
employed for understanding the relationships between people and things. As Gosden and 
Marshall (1999:169) stated, it has become a crucial aspect of all social sciences to understand the 
complex connection between objects and the people that interact with them. The concept of 
artifact biography has only recently been applied to shipwrecks. This thesis utilizes artifact 
biography to explore how Rob Roy is both a single artifact, particularist in nature, and a vector 
for sociocultural connections between individuals and places associated with the Civil War 
within the Gulf of Mexico. Sources of agency theory, artifact biography are reviewed, and used 
together in maritime archaeology, as well as discuss similar theoretical concepts that have been 
used when pieces of an artifact’s biography are missing. 
 
Agency 
An interest in agency increased in the 1980s and 1990s within academia, including archaeology. 
Archaeologists became interested in the relationship between agency and material things. The 
aspects of agency and archaeology research encompassed political power as well as the social 
structure of a society. Most agency theorists subscribe to four general principles derived from 
Karl Marx. These include “the material conditions of social life, the simultaneously constraining 
and enabling influence of social, symbolic and material structures and institutions, habituation, 
and beliefs; the importance of the motivations and actions of agents; and the dialectic of structure 
125 
 
and agency” (Dobres and Robb 2000:8). In, Agency in Archaeology, Dobres, and Robb (2000) 
compiled several authors’ interpretations of agency in archaeology.  In this compilation, Ian 
Hodder defines agency as a post-processual archaeological process where the individual acts and 
contributes directly to the social structure through the creation of material objects (Dobres and 
Robb 2000:22). John Barret agrees, but states that agency must be conceptualized within a 
specific time and space; agency is historically specific (Dobres and Robb 2000:62). Arthur Joyce 
reflects on these ideas of agency but emphasizes that it cannot be thought of separately from the 
social context in which an actor acts (Dobres and Robb 2000:72). John E. Clark goes as far as 
describing agency as “an inter-subjective social phenomenon” (Dobres and Robb 2000:96). 
Agency is facilitated by political power as objects are created and manipulated within a social 
structure (Dobres and Robb 2000:232). Kenneth Sassaman suggests that as agency is facilitated 
by power it can be unique to individuals as they live within a similar social structure (Dobres and 
Robb 2000:149). Agency cannot be clearly defined, but most theorists agree that there is a 
connection between agency and social structure. 
Agency theorists also struggle with scale: can agency refer to more than the individual? 
“Is it enough to talk vaguely about generic actors and agency, or do we need to consider multiple 
styles or varieties of agency within a society, such as those associated with gender, age, race, 
class, or other culturally recognized forms of subjecthood?” (Dobres and Robb 2000:11). A 
difficult aspect when using this theory is analyzing agency through material culture (Dobres and 
Robb 2000:12). To better understand the various ways agency is utilized the remainder of this 
section will explore uses of agency within both terrestrial and maritime archaeology. 
Shanks and Tilley (1987:173) elaborate on agency in archaeology when deciphering the 
social meanings behind beer labels and advertisements in England and Sweden. Beer agencies 
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use advertisements to connect with the consumer market and the need of the companies (Shanks 
and Tilley 1987:236). Three key points are made by Shanks and Tilley about agency in 
archaeology. First, “all action is social action” (Shanks and Tilley 1987:124). This means that an 
individual's action is always made within a given social construct. Second, social action is made 
purposely in response to the social construct surrounding the actor. Therefore, an individual 
knows that they are making an action based on the structure of which they are part, but they may 
not understand why they are making that action, unconsciously conscious. Finally, “all social 
actions are determined actions” (Shanks and Tilley 1987:124) because they are influenced by 
fear, from ideologies, from habit, or from personal values or desires. A consumer may choose a 
beer based on their own preferences and/or because of the influences an advertisement has on 
their decision-making process.  
Pauketat and Alt (2005) apply agency theory to archaeology in their research of the 
physicality of the “lowly” postmold. A postmold, of course, is the fossilized remnants of a 
deteriorated wooden pole placed in the ground by past humans. This remnant is often overlooked 
as it is considered nothing more than a mundane part of culture. Pauketat and Alt choose to look 
more closely at the implications a postmold can hold for understanding human behavior. In their 
eyes, “a single postmold embodies at least one short-term event or specific cultural practice, and 
possibly a sequence of such events or practices that are readily recovered by archaeologists 
through detailed field observations of postmold and post hole stratigraphy, superpositioning, and 
sedimentology” (Pauketat and Alt 2005:215). They explored the possible implications a 
postmold has for human behavior using three anecdotes. What they found was that the placement 
of a post hole was not culturally neutral. The cutting of the pole, the digging of the earth, the 
placement and later removal were consciously made and culturally specific (Pauketat and Alt 
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2005:217). A post represents multiple levels of human interactions from labor, to social and 
political structure, to interactions with landscapes. Pauketat and Alt (2005:218) argue that a 
postmold embodies every dimension “of the fundamental physicality of the process of cultural 
construction.” 
Richards and Staniforth provide an overview of abandoned watercrafts in Australia in 
their article on the Abandoned Ships’ Project. If agency theory is applied to this research, it 
becomes apparent that these discarded ships directly reflect changes within cultural behavior. 
“Deliberately abandoned ships are watercraft discarded by their owners in a purposeful, non-
catastrophic manner” (Richards and Staniforth 2006:84). This process of discard is a conscious 
decision of an actor and has unconscious effects on their social structure. A ship or watercraft is 
not simply an object to be documented and added to data but instead, like the postmold, is a 
direct representation of technology, hierarchy, political structure, and even identity of the human 
agents and objects in the network. Ships “are objects sensitive to cultural conditions and cultural 
transformations and have traits that illustrate their diachronic nature” (Richards and Staniforth 
2006:86). This study of deliberately abandoned ships brings the many meanings of agency full 
circle. The ship is an object to which an action is taken, the individual or group of individuals 
make a conscious decision to abandon their watercraft, the ship becomes a part of the maritime 
cultural landscape, an object that is neither natural nor social. This action becomes an ingrained 
part of the social structure of which an actor is a part. After this practice occurs regularly, it 
becomes a social norm and is carried out as an act of unconscious change.  
In maritime archaeology, researchers go a step further when considering the agency of 
people and objects, using actor-network theory (ANT), introduced by Bruno Latour in 2005. 
ANT is difficult to explain, but as Latour (2005: 9) writes, it is “sociology of the social,” the 
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“sociology of the associates,” and “sociology of translation.” “Actor Network as a theory is 
concerned with how networks get established and maintained, how phenomena get constructed 
and de-constructed and who in the network gets to speak on behalf of the rest” (Tuddenham 
2010:9). In his article on maritime cultural landscapes, Tuddenham addresses the difficulty 
associated with maritime studies, the dichotomy between land and sea. He uses the term 
maritimity as a category for understanding and purifying the process that takes place within the 
network (Tuddenham 2010:8). He emphasizes that all knowledge within the ANT is of the same 
kind; the only thing that differs is stability and length. The materials within a network are 
considered quasi objects and are representative of the phenomena occurring within a system 
(Tuddenham 2010:10). Tuddenham (2010:11) looks to Christopher Westerdahl considering the 
idea that perhaps the quasi objects within a network and the way in which those objects are 




The original concept of artifact biography stems from the theorist Igor Kopytoff (1986:90) who 
based his ideas on the “Durkheimian notion that a society orders the world of things on the 
pattern for the structure that prevails in the social world of its people,” and that societies hover 
over these two worlds simultaneously as they create artifacts using the same patterns. Though his 
theories are based in sociology, he realized that the things (artifacts) in a society are as integral to 
the livelihood of a culture as the people that own and make them. According to Kopytoff 
(1986:67) “biographies of things can make salient what might otherwise remain obscure.” In 
other words, by identifying the intricate interactions an object has during its lifetime, the 
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importance of the artifact is better understood. As in any biography, certain questions would 
need to be answered about the artifact, such as: Who made this object, and where does it come 
from? What has it been used for, and what do people consider important about that type of use? 
What time period does the life of the object fit into? How does the use of the object change 
during its lifetime, and what happens when it is no longer considered important? (Kopytoff 
1986:66-67). In complex societies, artifact biographies will reveal that within a world of uniform 
objects, a biography of a single artifact becomes unique (Kopytoff 1986:90), and as an object 
changes hands, gaining new classifications, so does its importance change which is directly 
reflected in its use.  
Objects continually gather new connections and meanings as they are never in a state of 
stasis (Gosden and Marshall 1999:170). An object moves between people and places and 
accumulates its own unique biography while adding to that of the people with whom it interacts 
(Gosden and Marshall 1999: 176). It is not enough to simply define the biography of a person or 
the biography of an object; to successfully portray an artifact biography, one must understand the 
relationships between both. After all, artifacts do not identify the individuality of a person, but 
rather a person and an artifact share a biography that will be specific to their individual culture 
(Gosden and Marshall 1999:173). 
Though Gosden and Marshall (1999) lean more heavily on life-history theory, first 
introduced by Ruth Tringham (1994), their approach shares similarities with examining the 
biographical background of an artifact and how important it is in analyzing social and cultural 
interaction. They also lean on the original notion of Kopytoff, who felt that to understand 
something one must understand all life stages fully. As they state, “if we consider material 
culture and its different moments of production, exchange and consumption, then little is left out, 
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especially once each of these is set within its social context and consequences” (Gosden and 
Marshall 1999:169). In their article, they reference an artifact from the Pitt Rivers Museum, neck 
ornamentation from Fiji made from whale teeth and coconut fibers (Gosden and Marshall 
1999:170). By providing the complex background of the object and the various people whose 
hands once interreacted with the object, they displayed how a seemingly static object is capable 
of having various life-histories encompassing an artifact’s made connections, meanings, and 
stories.  
The biography of an object can be found within the careful analysis of the item, how it 
looks, its wear and tear. It is through this lens that the story of an object comes to life. Several 
researchers have used the approach of artifact biography to explore the life of items ranging in 
size, shape, and history. In their article “Beyond Consumption: Functionality, Artifact 
Biography, and Early Modernity in a European Periphery,” Herva and Nurmi (2009) discuss the 
functionality and biographies of artifacts in the context of historical archaeology. Their argument 
is that researchers have spent too much time focusing on the symbolic representation of artifacts 
instead of understanding the everyday life of artifacts. Herva and Nurmi (2009:167) use artifact 
biography to explain the history of an artifact assemblage located within the city of Tornio, 
country. Their research identified examples of repair and recycling of artifacts, including pottery 
and pipes that had been broken but were re-purposed. The act of repairing and recycling is proof 
that those associated with an object hold a certain bond with it, and by employing these 
techniques, they intend to extend the life of the object (Herva and Nurmi 2009:175). According 
to historical records, Torrio was experiencing economic decline during the last half of the 
seventeenth century, which correlates with the need to recycle and repurpose. However, as the 
authors point out, the labor devoted to the recycling and repurposing of these objects would have 
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been intense. As such, this activity might be viewed as an expression of importance for items in 
the culture. Therefore, when an object is repurposed, especially during a period of economic 
strain, it suggests that that object may be worth the extensive time and labor.  
 As we learn through the process of biographical research, life does not necessarily follow 
a singular path (Joy 2009:543). As an object lives out its individual life, it “can die a number of 
times,” and it can lead “simultaneous lives” (Joy 2009:543). In her research on a British Iron Age 
mirror, Jody Joy (2009) discusses many social relationships the mirror accumulated over its life. 
She uses biography to consider the materials used in the process of creating the object such as 
metal for smelting and the charcoal or wood used to melt the metal. After a close analysis of the 
object, the implications of this fine metalworking provided an example of the important skill an 
individual might have needed in order to create this object. Not only is this mirror representation 
of the fine artists and work necessary in the Iron Age, but it also shows what type of social 
influence the people who made it had on the rest of their society. Her analysis of the mirror and 
its biography directly relate to the relationships created surrounding the object itself, whether that 
be past or present. For example, to have a mirror is for the inspection of self and to monitor 
personal appearance, ensuring that one might fit within certain cultural aspects or ideals of one’s 
time. The other inferences she makes when looking at the fine details of this artifact is that the 
care that was provided to this object over such a long time means that the importance of it not 
only changed but strengthened through time. Through her analysis, she created a flow chart to 




FIGURE 3.1. Stages in the construction of the Portesham mirror (Joy 2009:547). 
 While employing artifact biography, a writer must understand that they are actively 
adding to the interactions of that artifact. Pantaloney (2011) addresses this reality when 
examining the Thermatron Junior, an X-ray machine from Canada’s atomic age, on display at the 
Canada Science and Technology Museum. In his article, he stated, “that there are facts (and 
artifacts) we choose to emphasize and those we choose to leave out” (Pantaloney 2011:54). This 
suggests that the biography of an object is being added to as it is being written. Therefore, it is in 
the responsibility of an interpreter to review all aspects of an artifact. As such, his reexamination 
of the radiotherapy machine began with an analysis of where the Thermatron Junior was 
manufactured, followed by its use, its role in society when during its time in the limelight, and its 
role in the museum. The way the object was displayed in the museum suggested an idealized 
version of the object’s role instead of providing its audience with a detailed interpretation of the 
life history of the object. His purpose in completing a historical analysis of the Thermatron was 
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to emphasize that taking an object at face value is not enough, and a researcher must be open to 
all interpretations of an object. An artifact biography must be conducted with an objective 
approach and allow the object to tell its own story. After all, the biography of an object is a 
representation of all its social relationships (Cooper 2011:256). 
 
Agency and Artifact Biography in Maritime Archaeology 
In her thesis From Shipyard to Seabed: A Multiphasic Vessel Biography of Leven Lass [1839-
1854], Chelsea Colwell-Pasch (2014:27) uses a biographical approach to discuss Leven Lass. 
She cites the common approach of anthropologists and archaeologists use when studying the 
relationship between people and objects. Though she centralizes her research on the Wessex 
Archaeology BULSI system (Build, Use, Loss, Survival, Investigation), she references other 
theoretical archaeological concepts including artifact biography, use-life, life-cycle, and chaine 
opertoire all of which accent the relationships between human beings and things. The BULSI 
system stems from the idea of artifact biography that several sociologists and archaeologists have 
used to tell the story of various objects. Within her thesis, she provides a table that provides a 
synopsis of similar concepts to the BULSI system, such as artifact biography (Table 3.1). Her 
goal, like this thesis, was to describe and explain a ship’s multilevel ability to be viewed as an 








TABLE 3.1 THE EVOLUTION OF ARTEFACT/OBJECT LIFE HISTORY CONCEPTS 
OVER TIME (Colwell-Pasch 2014:30) 
Concept Formative 
Years 











The manufacturing use 
and disposal of artefacts 
follow a sequence of 
social acts, hence the 
translated term 
“operational sequence.” 
The sequence does not 
have to be linear. 






The time of artefact/object 
use before discard; 











Based on understanding 
site formation processes, 
the events leading up to, 
during, and after an 
objects/artefacts use are 
considered. This approach 


















A Framework used to 
understand the 
multivariate lifeways of 
an object/artefact through 

















shipwreck studies within 
consultancy. 
 
Colwell-Pasch draws on the previous work of Schiffer, Trigger, and Kopytoff in her 
exploration of life history models. Colwell-Pasch (2005:30) uses BULSI to conduct a full history 
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of Levin Lass, which provides a processual life history with sociocultural implications. The 
BULSI system was developed by Wessex Archaeology (2006a:25) and utilized in their coastal 
and marine division centers around the career or life-cycles of a vessel, including its build, use, 
loss, survival, and investigation. Wessex Archaeology was employed by the English Heritage 
organization to create a methodology for assessing of shipwrecks (Colwell-Pasch 2014:31). 
Colwell-Pasch makes use of the Wessex system because it was created specifically for 
shipwrecks and because it has ambiguous enough categories that can be manipulated with 
various types of data (Table 3.2). 
TABLE 3.2 OUTLINE OF THE BULSI SYSTEM OF LEVEN LASS  
(Colwell-Pasch 2014:45) 
Phase Wessex Archaeology Minimum Data 
Needed 
Data Sources 
Build Interest arising from the 
vessel as built, rebuilt, 




fixtures, and fittings, 
armament, etc. 













Use Interest arising from the 
vessel as used, including 
cargo, personal 
possessions, trade links, 
wars, life aboard, social 
organization, etc. 






crew and passengers, 








Loss Interest arising from the 
circumstances of the 
vessel’s demise, including 
last voyage, last action, 
cause of loss, acts of loss, 
etc. 
Close calls, date, place 
and reason of loss, loss 






Survival Interest arising from the 
wreck’s incorporation into 
the seabed, both to date 
Rescues, cargo salvage, 
history and survival as 






Phase Wessex Archaeology Minimum Data 
Needed 
Data Sources 

















Investigation Interest arising from the 
vessel being examined in 
the past, or in the future, 
including place in history 























Colwell-Pasch participated in both archaeological and historical investigations of Leven 
Lass, allowing her to identify all levels of the vessel’s life-cycle. The operations of Levin Lass 
led to several sociocultural interactions in Australia and various nations between individuals and 
even objects. For example, in1848, Leven Lass traveled to a total of four separate ports carrying 
rum, sugar, and molasses as cargo. During that time, Leven Lass underwent serious repairs 
(Colwell-Pasch 2014:54). This provided a basis for the interaction of several individuals. 
Whether that be between the dock workers and sailors or between the dock workers and 
merchants. That vessel’s one year of service provides a multitude of human-object relationships, 
all resulting in individualized agency.  
In the investigation of the complete life-cycle of a single 19th-century Clyde-built brig, 
Colwell-Pasch contributes to the overall history of Australian shipping, Clyde-built construction, 
trade, and varying levels of human-artifact interaction. Using her work as a basis, I will establish 
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the biography of an artifact, Rob Roy. I will not utilize the BULSI system but will pull from the 
concepts of other theorists and archaeologists that concentrate on the sociocultural interactions of 
humans and objects and the underlying belief in agency as the cause of these interactions. 
 
Conclusion  
The agency of an object and its resulting biography will not always be immediately present upon 
the first review of said object. Like the story of a person, one cannot take an object at face value 
but needs to delve deeper. To find the missing pieces of an object’s life story, you begin with 
what you know. As Schiffer (1972) suggests, an object like a human is born, and through its life, 
it has several beginnings and endings, this biography of an artifact can link both people and 
things. This thesis stands on the understanding that “no one theory will ever be adequate to 
understand all circumstances” (Gosden and Marshall 1999:172). However, it is the goal of this 
thesis to complete an artifact biography of Rob Roy with historical and archaeological research 
because, as Kopytoff (1986:67) states, “biographies of things can make salient what might 
otherwise remain obscure.” 
